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Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation:  
Moving beyond the Entropic Dilemma  
Sungjoon Cho* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1990s, as the historic Uruguay Round struggled toward a 
successful conclusion, a panel established under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”),1 which had governed international trade for the 
previous half century, struck down a recently enacted US embargo on Mexican 
yellow-finned tuna.2 The US Marine Mammal Protection Act of 19723 had 
proscribed a certain controversial tuna fishing practice that inevitably caused the 
incidental killing of dolphins on a large scale. The gist of the panel’s ruling was 
that the US embargo was not necessary to protect marine mammals because the 
US had failed to explore other reasonable, less trade-restrictive alternatives, 
including reaching a cooperative arrangement with tuna exporters such as 
Mexico. 
Whatever the merits of the panel decision, environmentalists in the US and 
other Western countries led popular protests against the decision based on the 
view that it had arrogantly countermanded a widely popular domestic measure 
intended to protect the beloved dolphin, as well as other endangered marine 
mammals. Some protesters performed a scene in which “GATTzilla,” a 
demonization of GATT as the famed Japanese monster, devoured helpless little 
                                                 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, SJD 
2002 (Harvard). I thank Professors Joseph Weiler, William Alford, Joel Trachtman and Dean 
Anne-Marie Slaughter for their support and inspiration. I am grateful to Matthew Christensen for 
his valuable comments on an earlier draft. I am also indebted to the editorial efforts of Wonbin 
Kang and the other staff members of the Chicago Journal of International Law. All errors, of course, 
are mine. 
1   The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 485 (GATT Secretariat 1994) (hereinafter GATT 1947).  
2  GATT Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R–39 S/155 (Sept 
3, 1991). 
3  Pub L No 92-522, 86 Stat 107 (1972), codified at 16 USC § 1361 (1994). 
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dolphins. Through this and other similar publicity methods, protesters were 
quite successful in depicting GATT—and free tradists in general—as cold-
blooded monsters that cared little about legitimate environmental causes. 
In the late 1990s, hope and frustration contended once again in the lead-up 
to the historic Seattle Round, which was marred by a protest with an estimated 
50,000 to 100,000 participants. This global alliance of protesters, unprecedented 
in scale and intensity, accused the World Trade Organization (“WTO”),4 the 
successor to the old GATT, of ignoring environmental values in the name of 
free trade. This time, the alleged victims were sea turtles sacrificed in the process 
of shrimp harvesting. In a decision rendered not long before the Seattle 
Ministerial Meeting, the WTO Appellate Body struck down a US ban on shrimp 
harvested by India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand which used shrimping 
methods that inevitably caused the incidental killing of sea turtles on a large 
scale. The Seattle protest was fueled by a generalized antiglobalization mood, 
reinforced by an unlikely alliance between “Turtles and Teamsters,” and finally 
aided by then President Bill Clinton’s unexpected expression of sympathy for 
the goals of the street protesters. In the end, the Seattle Round proved to be a 
fiasco. 
The two cases described above illustrate a glaring tension between free 
trade and social regulations in areas such as environmental protection. On the 
one hand, such tension eloquently demonstrates the existence in a 
phenomenological sense of a certain “link” or “linkage” between various 
competing values associated with the regulation of international trade. In fact, 
this linkage seems an inevitable phenomenon considering the multiplicity of 
values that individuals, states, and institutions pursue. People seem to desire free 
trade—or at least global free markets, driven by the principle of efficiency—that 
expands economic opportunity and promotes material welfare. At the same 
time, they also yearn for a better quality of life—including better social hygiene 
in the areas of environmental quality and human safety—and value the principle 
of regulatory autonomy. 
Yet in the real world, such values and policy objectives are not formulated 
or analyzed in isolation. Rather, they tend to be addressed in combination by 
means of relational approaches that emphasize areas of mutual influence. This 
relational posture, which is strongly influenced by the current high level of 
economic interdependency, is itself a function of the natural linkage among the 
values in question. 
                                                 
4  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, in The Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 6 (cited in note 1) (hereinafter WTO 
Agreement).  
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On the other hand, tension stemming from competing values constitutes a 
threat to the institutional integrity of the global trading system. Since no trading 
system can long survive a high degree of internal friction, hostility, or 
contradiction, the global trading system has tended to try to eliminate or at least 
mitigate such internal tension wherever possible. From a deontological 
perspective, linkage or “trade and . . .” phenomena should be addressed 
effectively in order to maintain a healthy global trading system. 
Given the normative significance of the linkage phenomenon for the future 
of international trade, it comes as no surprise that international law scholars 
have recently attempted to diagnose and prescribe solutions from a variety of 
analytical perspectives. Yet despite the richness and creativity of this growing 
body of literature, the existing works still leave much to be desired. For instance, 
however ambitious they may be, many are too theoretical or hypothetical, 
leaving their practical or pragmatic value in doubt.5 A more serious problem lies 
in their failure or inadequate devotion to analyze the telos of the global trading 
system—that is, “what the global trading system is for” and “where it should be 
directed”—in the context of the linkage debate. Just as any meaningful 
prescription for institutional change must be rooted firmly in a clear 
understanding of the identity and purpose of that institution, so it is that any 
normative or institutional attempt to tackle linkage issues must be premised on 
the very rationale of the contemporary global trading system, for example, the 
coherent pursuit of trade and social values.6 Otherwise, any approach to linkage, 
however ingenious it may appear on the surface, will ultimately prove to be 
vulnerable to attack from either side. 
Focusing on the tension between free trade and social regulation, this 
Article argues that the WTO, in alliance with other international institutions, 
must develop a synergistic, nonentropic linkage within the constitutional 
structure of the global trading system. In the analysis set forth below, 
considerable emphasis is placed on the concept of a “trade constitution.” This is 
because any practical prescriptions for achieving the desired synergy must 
necessarily flow from an accurate understanding of the capabilities and 
constraints of legal and political realities inherent to a broad multisphere trading 
system composed of Member states, the WTO, and other international 
organizations. In each context, the development of a synergistic solution will 
require us to select, depending upon institutional feasibility, from a variety of 
institutional options reflecting various degrees of linkage. For example, the 
WTO jurisprudence on trade and the environment has a different meaning, and 
makes a different contribution to a synergistic linkage between free trade and 
                                                 
5  See Sections II–III of this Article for an extended discussion of this issue. 
6  See Sections III–IV.  
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 628 Vol. 5 No. 2 
environmental protection, than do discussions and recommendations under the 
WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment. This pragmatic multifaceted 
approach will eventually form the basis of a holistic vision of the global trading 
system.  
In the discussion that follows, Section I begins by exploring the genesis of 
linkage. Although its relative emphasis may be a recent development, linkage is 
not itself a new phenomenon, but a long-contemplated topic in the history of 
international trade. Section II surveys and categorizes the contemporary linkage 
debate from three aspects: motivation (why to link), desirability (whether to link), 
and issue areas (what to link). It then critiques the existing literature, arguing that 
representative works are either too hypothetical, unempirical, or narrowly 
focused on particular regulatory topics. Against the backdrop of this critique, 
Section III shifts the focus of the linkage debate to the tension between free 
trade and social regulation. Based on the view that this tension could, if left 
unaddressed, ultimately lead to an entropic disaster of either trade failure or 
regulatory failure, Section IV proposes a synergistic understanding of competing 
values that emphasizes, and is consistent with, the WTO’s integrationist telos. 
Based on this synergistic vision, and within the bounds of institutional feasibility, 
Section IV explores a multifaceted list of options, the implications of which 
extend well beyond the narrow terrain of WTO activities. These options include 
jurisprudence, harmonization, surveillance, international standards and 
government networks, and interinstitutional cooperation. In a brief conclusion, I 
argue that the proper management of linkage will enhance the legitimacy of the 
global trading system as a whole. 
I. THE GENESIS OF LINKAGE 
The history of linkage dates back to the dawn of the modern global trading 
system. After the end of World War II, the Allies, at the behest of the US, came 
up with an ambitious blueprint for a postwar international economic order. This 
project, commonly known as the “Bretton Woods system,”7 comprised three 
main pillars: “international trade” under the auspices of an International Trade 
Organization (“ITO”), “international monetary and financial matters” under the 
auspices of the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), and “international 
development” under the auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development. Initially, the operational sphere of the ITO was very broad, 
addressing a number of important social issues such as labor and competition 
                                                 
7  Bretton Woods is a small resort town in New Hampshire that hosted the epic meetings at which 
the broad outlines of a postwar international economic order were conceived. 
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policy that lay outside the scope of international trade per se.8 In this initial 
linkage between trade and nontrade, the inclusion of social concerns must be 
understood in the context of the bitter social upheaval that accompanied the 
Great Depression and scattered the seeds of World War II.9  
Yet this grand vision never materialized, mainly because the US 
administration at the time failed to secure congressional approval for the 
creation of the ITO. Interestingly, it was the inclusion of such subjects as labor 
and unemployment that undermined congressional support for the ITO. The 
Republican-dominated Congress was resistant to the idea that the Executive 
Branch should play such a comprehensive role in the international arena without 
the traditional checks and balances. Following the official demise of the ITO 
and a number of intermittent efforts to revive it, the grand enterprise was 
reduced to GATT. Originally conceived as one of many chapters of the ITO 
Charter, GATT took the form of an executive agreement with the Protocol of 
Provisional Application consisting of little more than derogations and 
exemptions. Nonetheless, even in this minimalist approach, a certain link 
between trade and social regulation could be found. Whereas GATT Articles I 
and III enshrined bedrock free trade principles such as Most-Favored Nation 
and National Treatment, Article XX (General Exceptions) responded to a 
variety of social concerns, such as protection of the environment and human 
health, and provided that they could, under certain circumstances, override the 
free trade obligations set forth in other provisions. Although a detailed 
discussion of the historical development of the international trading system is 
beyond the scope of this Article, the foregoing summary should suffice to 
illustrate that linkage is not a new issue per se.10 On the other hand, the 
phenomenon of linkage has recently begun to receive an unprecedented degree 
of scholarly attention for reasons that will be discussed in the following section. 
                                                 
8  See John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT (Bobbs-Merrill 1969). 
9  For a general discussion, see John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions and Change: 
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 Intl Org 379 (1982). See also Anne-Marie 
Burley, Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal 
Regulatory State, in John Gerard Ruggie, ed, Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an 
Institutional Form 125 (Columbia 1993). 
10  See Debra P. Steger, Afterword: The “Trade and . . .” Conundrum—A Commentary, 96 Am J Intl L 135 
(2002). See also John H. Jackson, The Perils Of Globalization and the World Trading System, 24 
Fordham Intl L J 371, 374 (2000):  
[S]ome people in the United States have argued that we should reverse course 
and take the WTO back to the time when it was responsible only for border 
measures, thereby limiting its ability to affect national regulation internally. . . . 
This is folly, because such time never existed. It was always recognized that 
there were measures in GATT that would have effects behind the border. 
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II. THE LINKAGE NARRATIVES: CURRENT DEBATES 
A. CATEGORIZATION 
The recent academic debate surrounding the linkage issue has produced a 
voluminous and expanding literature. Containing as it does many useful insights 
and contributions, a careful review of this literature is a necessary prerequisite to 
the task of diagnosing problems and prescribing solutions to the linkage issue. A 
detailed and systematic review of such a rich and variegated body of work, 
however, would require far more space than a brief article permits.11 Therefore, 
the focus of the following critique of this literature is restricted to three major 
concerns: motivation (why to link), desirability (whether to link), and issue areas 
(what to link). Importantly, these three aspects of linkage are inseparably 
connected to one another. For example, the “desirability” of linkage tends to 
influence its “motivation.” Those who advocate the close linkage of human 
rights to trade may hold a great incentive in strategizing their position in the 
negotiation settings.12 For another example, “issue areas” are naturally revealed 
in the course of analyzing the “desirability” of linkage. Those who denounce the 
linkage of human rights to trade as yet another manifestation of protectionism 
would naturally strive to exclude this area from the normative reach of 
international trade. 
B. VARIOUS ASPECTS OF LINKAGE 
1. Motivation (Why to Link) 
Some scholars view linkage not only as a natural phenomenon, driven by 
economic interdependency, but also as a purposeful enterprise. For instance, 
Frieder Roessler argues that linkage proposals, such as “green[ing]” the WTO or 
“tak[ing] up” labor rights, aim to “change domestic policies in these [issue] 
areas” via trade restrictions.13 He suggests four motivations behind these 
proposals: “offset[ing] differences between domestic policies,” “eliminat[ing] 
                                                 
11  For another attempt to categorize the linkage literature, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, “Trade and”: Recent 
Developments in Trade Policy and Scholarship—And Their Surprising Political Implications, 17 Nw J Intl L 
& Bus 759, 760–761 (1996–97) (identifying three different approaches to linkage: “traditional,” 
“critical,” and “interdisciplinary”). 
12  See Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human Rights: A 
Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization, 11 Am U J Intl L & Poly 1, 34 (1996) 
(proposing the creation of a side agreement as a “human rights arm” under the WTO system to 
enforce human rights via trade sanctions).  
13  Frieder Roessler, Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade Integration, in Jagdish Bhagwati and 
Robert E. Hudec, eds, Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol 2: Legal Analysis 
21, 36 (MIT 1996).  
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differences between domestic policies,” “domestic bargaining across issue 
areas,” and “international [political] bargaining across issue areas.”14 He then 
criticizes these motivations by arguing that a tariff or subsidy can be a better tool 
to offset such differences, that positive harmonization to eliminate such 
differences is hard to achieve under the WTO, that trade restrictions should not 
be employed to support “domestic political coalitions” among interest groups, 
and that linkages beyond manageably related issue areas cannot be stably 
maintained.15  
From yet another purposeful standpoint, certain subject matters or issue 
areas can be exchanged and bargained for in negotiation settings. For instance, 
in the Uruguay Round negotiation, developed countries successfully included 
new issues such as intellectual property rights and services in the WTO system in 
return for acceptance of developing countries’ perennial wish lists, including a 
phase-out of textile quotas.16 David Leebron depicts this strong “reciprocal” 
type of linkage as “strategic linkage”17 or “issue barter.”18 In a similar tone, José 
Alvarez describes the “nesting” of various subjects within the WTO.19 Yet 
scholars like John Jackson challenge this type of linkage on the ground that 
reciprocity, unlike traditional tariff negotiation, does not address the “non-tariff” 
regulatory barriers that most linkage issues involve.20 It would be fair to say that 
such linkage bargaining does not enjoy a normative justification, though it can 
certainly be translated into a kind of political bargaining “game.”21 Worse, if such 
bargaining is conducted in a disproportionate manner that provides benefits to 
rich countries at the expense of poor countries, it becomes tantamount to the 
“launder[ing]” of unilateral pressures by rich and powerful (Western) countries.22 
As Alvarez pointedly observes, the result may decidedly seem to be a form of 
“neoimperialism” to those in poorer countries.23 
Attempts at laundering or the strategic linkage of certain issue areas 
espoused by developed countries and the northern nongovernmental 
organizations (“NGOs”), such as human rights or labor standards, are often 
                                                 
14  Id at 36–37. 
15  Id at 51–52. 
16  José E. Alvarez, The WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 Am J Intl L 146, 147 (2002). 
17  David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 Am J Intl L 5, 12 (2002). 
18  Id at 13. 
19  Alvarez, 96 Am J Intl L at 147 (cited in note 16) 
20  John H. Jackson, Afterword: The Linkage Problem—Comments on Five Texts, 96 Am J Intl L 118, 121 
(2002). 
21  See Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 World Pol 25, 45 (1985). 
22  Alvarez, 96 Am J Intl L at 148 (cited in note 16) 
23  Id at 152. 
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characterized by a moralistic streak. Moralism is invoked to justify the use of the 
WTO’s teeth—in other words, sanctions—in the event of violations of these 
norms. However, many developing countries have alleged that the reality behind 
such rhetoric, obscured by the moral high ground, amounts to little more than 
disguised protectionism. Following this line of argument, Jagdish Bhagwati 
observes that forced harmonization toward higher social standards often 
originates from “commercial” considerations. That is, the phenomenon is driven 
not by altruistic concern for the welfare of people living in developing countries 
but by the complaints of producers in rich countries that a lower regulatory 
burden on poor country exporters is “unfair.”24 The conflict between these 
contrasting positions ultimately raises the issue of the “desirability” of linkage, 
which is discussed in the following section. 
2. Desirability (Whether to Link) 
The demand for linkage often stems from a desire to capitalize on certain 
institutional benefits of the WTO, such as its enforcement mechanism, in 
addressing nontrade issues, such as labor standards and human rights, when 
national regulatory efforts fail to satisfy certain domestic constituencies. In this 
regard, the WTO has certainly become a popular “magnet” for social policies,25 
“pull[ing] many international lawyers towards international adjudication as the 
primary method for linkage.”26 Yet as Leebron points out, this “regime 
borrowing” is only a “second-best solution” since it falls short of improving an 
unsatisfactory linked regime independently.27 In the same context, Alvarez warns 
against the linkage of human rights and trade on the ground that international 
human rights law is porous and incomplete, providing, for example, no universal 
consensus on the content of material obligations.28 From a different perspective, 
Jeffrey Dunoff argues that the “incorporation of other bodies of international 
law” into the WTO system may unduly increase the legalization of those other 
bodies when such a development is not proper.29 
                                                 
24  Jagdish Bhagwati, Introduction, in Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec, eds, Fair Trade and 
Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol 1: Economic Analysis 1, 5 (MIT 1996). 
25  Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade Organization, 96 Am J Intl L 28, 29 (2002); Sylvia 
Ostry, The WTO and International Governance, in Klaus Günter Deutsch and Bernhard Speyer, eds, 
The World Trade Organization Millennium Round: Freer Trade in the Twenty-First Century 285, 290, 293 
(Routledge 2001). 
26  José E. Alvarez, How Not To Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded Trade Regime, 7 Widener 
L Symp J 1, 15 (2001). 
27  Leebron, 96 Am J Intl L at 27 (cited in note 17). 
28  Alvarez, 7 Widener L Symp J at 6 (cited in note 26). 
29  Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The WTO in Transition: Of Constituents, Competence and Coherence, 33 Geo Wash 
Intl L Rev 979, 1012 (2001). 
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Many other scholars, including economists and legal scholars alike, accept 
this negative point of view on linkage for various reasons. Jim Rollo and Alan 
Winters observe that enforcing higher labor and environmental standards via 
trade sanctions will result in not only the maladministration of those standards 
but also the loss of the traditional economic benefits of trade liberalization.30 
Frieder Roessler sides with this view by maintaining that linkage will fail to 
achieve both trade liberalization and regulatory objectives of linked subjects.31 At 
a deeper level, Robert Stern trenchantly observes that the best way to achieve 
higher labor standards in developing countries is to open the markets of 
developed countries and encourage the economic development of developing 
countries.32 Along similar lines, Gregory Shaffer offers the insight that such 
linkage efforts will eventually fail in the absence of material financial assistance 
to poor countries to help the latter meet the higher regulatory standards 
demanded by rich countries.33 
In parallel with the critical views described in the preceding paragraph, 
most developing countries strongly reject the idea of linkage, mainly due to the 
fear of protectionism.34 This allergic reaction by developing countries to any 
attempt to link nontrade regulatory issues to trade is in part attributable to the 
fact that the Uruguay Round has been implemented in a “strikingly asymmetrical 
manner” to the detriment of developing countries.35 For instance, developed 
countries have done little to phase out quotas on textiles and clothing as 
mandated by the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, while increasingly 
pressuring developing countries to implement the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”).36 
Nonetheless, some scholars have highlighted the benign effects that linkage 
may deliver under certain circumstances. Here, one finds a varying degree of 
intensity of such linkage along a wide continuum of perspectives. A modest 
                                                 
30  Jim Rollo and L. Alan Winters, Subsidiarity and Governance Challenges for the WTO: Environmental and 
Labor Standards, in Bernard Hoekman and Will Martin, eds, Developing Countries and the WTO: A 
Pro-Active Agenda 185, 198–99 (Blackwell 2001). 
31  See Frieder Roessler, Domestic Policy Objectives and the Multilateral Trade Order: Lessons from the Past, 19 
U Pa J Intl Econ L 513, 514 (1998). 
32  Robert M. Stern, Labor Standards and Trade, in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick, eds, New 
Directions in International Economic Law: Essays in Honor of John H. Jackson 425, 437 (Kluwer 2000). 
33  Gregory Shaffer, WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of U.S. Domestic Politics on Trade-Labor, Trade-
Environment Linkages for the WTO’s Future, 24 Fordham Intl L J 608, 647–48 (2000). 
34  For a well-documented explanation of developing countries’ concern in this issue, see Jose M. 
Salazar-Xirinachs, The Trade-Labor Nexus: Developing Countries’ Perspectives, 3 J Intl Econ L 377 
(2000).  
35  Dunoff, 33 Geo Wash Intl L Rev at 981 (cited in note 29). 
36  Id. 
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approach tends to espouse coexistence of trade and human rights obligations 
and acknowledge the need to sensitize the WTO in favor of human rights 
protection. Gabrielle Marceau argues that a good faith interpretation of the 
WTO treaties should take into account all relevant international law obligations 
including human rights, and that there exists a “soft presumption” against 
conflicts between trade and human rights obligations.37 However, she opposes 
the idea of enforcing human rights obligations through the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism on the grounds of the specificity of WTO rights and 
obligations, as well as the “limited jurisdiction” of the WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body.38 
A more proactive approach endeavors to integrate certain core elements of 
human rights obligations within the domain of WTO norms. Sandra Polaski, for 
example, observes that developing countries, if they adopt certain minimum 
workers’ rights such as the “right to organize unions and bargain over wages,” 
can effectively alleviate their poverty and income inequality while improving 
their market access to those developed countries that condition market access 
upon compliance with minimum labor standards.39 In a similar vein, Virginia 
Leary proposes a multilateral approach to the incorporation of social clauses, for 
example, fundamental workers’ rights or minimum international labor standards, 
into the WTO. Leary’s approach would involve entrusting the International 
Labor Organization (“ILO”) with major competences covering the 
interpretation of fundamental or minimum international labor standards, and 
possible dispute resolution through “fact finding” and “moral persuasion.”40 
At the other end of the spectrum, a radical approach attempts to 
“constitutionalize” international trade law in the name of human rights. Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann identifies certain human rights functions in WTO rules, such 
as the nondiscrimination principle, and then constitutionalizes them in the 
broader terrain of “Global Integration Law.”41 Working from his unique 
understanding of EC integration law, Petersmann envisions a “worldwide 
integration law” that empowers WTO citizens to retain and exercise their 
                                                 
37  Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 Eur J Intl L 753, 805 (2002). 
38  Id at 767. 
39  Sandra Polaski, Trade and Labor Standards: A Strategy for Developing Countries 4 (2003), available 
online at <http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/Polaski_Trade.asp?from=pubdate> (visited 
Nov 10, 2004). 
40  Virginia A. Leary, Workers’ Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause (GATT, ILO, NAFTA, 
U.S. Laws), in Bhagwati and Hudec, eds, 2 Fair Trade and Harmonization 177, 223 (cited in note 13).   
41  Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: 
Lessons from European Integration Law for Global Integration Law 34–44 (2002) (Jean Monnet Working 
Paper No 7/01), available online at <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/ 
02/021201.html> (visited Nov 10, 2004). 
Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation Cho 
Winter 2005 635 
economic human rights such as freedom to trade, which are indivisible from other 
civil and political human rights, both in domestic and international arenas.42 
Furthermore, Petersmann argues for “express references” to human rights 
protection in WTO Ministerial Declarations or WTO jurisprudence in order to 
“enhance a more coherent constitutional discourse and more general awa reness 
of the complementary functions of human rights and of global integration 
law.”43 His approach has provoked significant criticism from many sides. For 
instance, Philip Alston observes that: 
this process of human rights-based (or more accurately human rights 
justified) ‘constitutionalization’ of the WTO is a highly contentious one. 
While it is true that some human rights, and many labour rights, proponents 
would like to see a significant role for the Organization in these respects, . . . 
they certainly do not see it as an Organization which is designed, structured, 
or suitable to operate in the way that one with major human rights 
responsibilities would. The Agreement Establishing the WTO is not a 
constitutional instrument in the sense of constituting a political or social 
community, and its mandate and objectives are narrowly focused around the 
goal of ‘expanding the production of and trade in goods and services.’44 
In sum, there is as yet no academic consensus on the desirability of linkage. 
With respect to human rights, in particular, the issue remains open to further 
debate and controversy. 
3. Issue Areas (What to Link) 
Inseparable from the foregoing discussions of “why to link” and “whether 
to link” is the question of “what to link.” Inevitably, discussions surrounding the 
former two aspects of linkage are framed in terms of particular subject areas, 
such as labor or the environment, on a selective basis. Therefore, one should 
always bear in mind this interrelationship among three aspects of linkage when 
reviewing the literature on linkage, especially those studies that directly address 
the question of “what to link.” 
One detects a wide spectrum of opinion in the literature dealing with 
linkage in light of the WTO’s accommodating stance on various issue areas. 
Making a bold case for a World Economic Organization (“WEO”), Marco 
Bronckers rejects the “mono-culture” view of the WTO while promoting a 
                                                 
42  Id at 13, 30. 
43  Id at 44. 
44  Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann 
30 (2002) (Jean Monnet Working Paper No 12/02), available online at 
<http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/02/021201-02.html> (visited Nov 10, 2004) 
(emphasis added). See also Robert Howse, Human Rights in the WTO: Whose Rights, What 
Humanity?: Comment on Petersmann (2002) (Jean Monnet Working Paper No 12/02), available online 
at <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/02/021201-01.html> (visited Nov 10, 2004). 
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much broader concept of its potential.45 Working from the philosophical 
premise that the WTO could embrace other societal values, such as labor and 
environmental protection,46 Bronckers proposes a number of institutional 
reforms aimed at achieving “[i]nternal coexistence” between the WTO and side 
agreements such as the General Agreement on Trade Services (“GATS”) and 
TRIPs as well as “[e]xternal co-operation” with other institutional organizations 
such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) and ILO for the 
purpose of enabling the WTO to effectively address such societal values.47  
Other scholars take a more selective approach. Focusing on market access 
issues, Kyle Bagwell, Petros Mavroidis, and Robert Staiger advocate broadening 
the linkage horizon only to the extent that it includes those regulatory issues that 
address “pecuniary externalities,” such as “race-to-the bottom” and “regulatory-
chill concerns.”48 From a more theoretical and analytical perspective, some 
scholars attempt to establish criteria for determining which issue areas should be 
brought within the WTO’s domain through linkage. Philip Nichols, for example, 
suggests four attributes of a successful candidate for linkage: first, the issue lies 
“squarely within the legal competency” of the WTO; second, “the issue is 
significant”; third, the WTO is “capable of enforcing any guidelines it issues 
concerning the issue; and fourth, that the issue requires international 
coordination, and that the [WTO] will provide the optimal coordination.”49 
Applying this checklist to the issue of “transnational bribery,” Nichols contends 
that the WTO should disseminate guidelines for curbing it.50 Along similar lines, 
Steve Charnovitz examines competing ideas and various assumptions about the 
rationale of the WTO in the process of formulating a set of criteria (“frames”) 
for determining the proper content of the WTO.51 Out of three different 
categories (“state-to-state relations,” “domestic politics,” and “international 
organization”), Charnovitz introduces eight possible “frames” for deciding 
which issues should properly be considered within the domain of the WTO. In 
this scheme, the eight “frames” are divided into those dealing with state-to-state 
relations (“Cooperative Openness,” “Harmonization,” “Fairness,” and “Risk 
Reduction”), those dealing with domestic politics (“Self-Restraint” and 
                                                 
45  See Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, More Power to the WTO?, 4 J Intl Econ L 41, 44 (2001). 
46  Id at 53–56.  
47  Id at 46, 49. 
48  Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Robert W. Staiger, It’s a Question of Market Access, 96 Am J 
Intl L 56, 56–57 (2002).  
49  Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organization: Discerning the Limits of the World Trade 
Organization’s Authority, 28 NYU J Intl L & Pol 711, 714 (1996). 
50  Id. 
51  Charnovitz, 96 Am J Intl L at 29–30 (cited in note 25). 
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“Coalition Building”), and those dealing with international organization (“Trade 
Functionalism” and “Comparative Institutionalism”).52 
Finally, a word of caution may be in order for the sake of clarification. The 
incorporation of certain areas, such as “services” and “intellectual property 
rights,” into the WTO system has often been misconstrued as involving 
examples of linkage, as can be seen in the use of phrases such as “trade and 
services” or “trade and intellectual property rights.” However, these subject 
areas constitute “trade” areas themselves and should be approached as “trade in 
services” and “trade in intellectual property rights,” rather than as examples of 
linkage. At the same time, it should be understood that independent linkage 
problems can and do occur in these areas, for example in the case of “trade and 
environment” within the context of GATS. 
C. CRITIQUE 
This rich literature on linkage has made a major contribution to identifying 
this important problem and developing possible solutions. Yet many studies 
approach the issue from a “top-down” perspective and consequently fail to 
address the normative and institutional realities of the current global trading 
system.53 As a result, insufficient attention is paid to microinstitutions that could 
be mobilized to address linkage issues. Similarly, normative obstacles to the 
realization of the institutional visions set forth in such studies are given short 
shrift. While these works may offer significant merits in terms of theorizing and 
conceptualizing the linkage issue, they are generally deficient in the area of 
practical advice for policymakers and trade negotiators. In this regard, John 
Jackson, Jagdish Bhagwati, and Debra Steger have all criticized such studies as 
lacking empirical, policy-oriented, and development-oriented perspectives.54 
At the same time, a narrow focus on a particular issue area should not be 
confused with the kind of empirical, practical perspectives that scholars like 
Jackson, Baghwati, and Steger would seem to advocate. To be sure, most 
debates on linkage focus on particular issues, such as labor, environment, or 
human rights. Perhaps, as Robert Hudec observes, “each author’s particular 
contribution inevitably reflects that authors’ professional perspectives.”55 
                                                 
52  Id at 36–54. 
53  See Leebron, 96 Am J Intl L at 5 (cited in note 17); Charnovitz, 96 Am J Intl L at 28 (cited in note 
25); Philip M. Nichols, Forgotten Linkages—Historical Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism and 
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 19 U Pa J Intl Econ L 461 (1998). 
54  Jackson, 96 Am J Intl L at 118–19 (cited in note 20); Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: The Question of 
Linkage, 96 Am J Intl L 126 (2002); Steger, 96 Am J Intl L at 135 (cited in note 10). 
55  Robert E. Hudec, Introduction to the Legal Studies, in Bhagwati and Hudec, eds, 2 Fair Trade and 
Harmonization 1, 14 (cited in note 13).  
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Although this tendency certainly enriches the debate by adding elements of 
specialization and professionalization, it also hinders the development of a 
coherent and consistent set of criteria capable of guiding the discussion on 
issues of linkage in productive directions. Such scattered narratives on linkage 
eventually fail to offer a more genuine understanding of the policy challenges 
lurking behind linkage debates. That is, they fail to explain the tension between 
trade and nontrade values, as well as its constitutional and evolutionary nature 
within the context of the current global trading community.56 Yet a genuine 
understanding of these aspects of linkage would provide academics and the 
general public alike with a much clearer comprehension of the linkage 
phenomenon as a whole. In the absence of such general, policy-based 
understanding, it is difficult to explain why certain issues are easier to address 
than others under current circumstances. Like in the old saying, it is difficult to 
see the forest when one is preoccupied with individual trees.  
Put differently, the intensive focus on particular regulatory subjects tends 
to push the studies in question toward increasingly extreme points on the 
ideological spectrum between laissez-faire and dirigiste economies. Free tradists 
tend to oppose the idea of linkage itself, fearing an inundation of regulatory 
barriers. By contrast, domestic regulators and certain NGOs tend to advocate 
linkage, desiring to capitalize on the high-caliber WTO machinery to further 
their particular regulatory visions. The uncompromising nature of the 
conventional linkage narratives thus tends to thwart the development of an 
eclectic matrix of solutions that would be more feasible in reality. Critically, 
linkage is always a matter of degree. The intensity of linkage need not necessarily 
be strong, as manifested through trade sanctions, but could be modest, as 
observed in various WTO Committees, such as the Committee on Trade and 
Environment,57 which engage mainly in research and the exchange of 
information. 
In theory, a variety of positions could be contrived in this wide spectrum 
to effectively reconcile the tension between trade and specific nontrade social 
issues. Yet much of the literature proposes solutions in a binary way as a 
question of bundled competence. That is, they ask whether the WTO can and 
should address labor or environmental issues in their entirety. Whatever their 
merits, binary solutions interfere with the development of more subtle 
methodologies. One such methodology explored in greater detail below involves 
                                                 
56  For general discussion, see Sungjoon Cho, Free Markets and Social Regulation: A Reform Agenda of the 
Global Trading System 11–15 (Kluwer 2003).  
57  See World Trade Organization, Work in the Committee on Trade and Environment, available online at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/wrk_committee_e.htm> (visited Nov 10, 
2004). 
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approaching the WTO’s institutional apparatus from a functional perspective in 
which the General Council, the Appellate Body, and the Committee on Trade 
and Environment are each examined in terms of their potential contributions to 
resolving the linkage dilemma. 
In sum, to understand the true realities underlying the linkage 
phenomenon, we should move in a disciplined manner from posing appropriate 
questions to exploring a feasible set of solutions in response to those questions. 
In particular, it is crucial to recast the linkage question in terms of a tension 
between trade and nontrade social values and to contemplate solutions not only 
in terms of what to link but more importantly in terms of how to link. The next 
two sections will address these challenges in turn. 
III. THE TRUE NATURE OF LINKAGE: TENSION BETWEEN 
FREE TRADE AND SOCIAL REGULATION 
A. LINKAGE AS A SOURCE OF TENSION 
As discussed above, the real question underlying all linkage issues—be they 
trade and health, trade and labor, trade and environment, or trade and human 
rights—is the tension between free markets and social regulation. A hypothetical 
case may illustrate this tension. Consider the following scenario. 
Currently, even a small Mexican toy company can easily gain access to 
French consumers via e-commerce. Suppose, however, that the EU suddenly 
launches a new directive to ban the importation of products containing an 
allegedly toxic substance, which the small Mexican toy company happens to use. 
Suppose further that the substance in question is legal under both the Mexican 
regulatory regime and the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) 
because no clear scientific evidence has been adduced to prove its potential 
harm to children. In this scenario, the global trading system would be caught in a 
dilemma. First, if the European ban is allowed to stand, not only Mexican toy 
companies, but also most North American toy factories, may lose access to the 
European markets. This is a trade failure. On the other hand, to strike the ban in 
the name of free trade would force citizens of European countries to endure fear 
and anxiety over their children’s health despite the fact that the ban was not 
intended to protect certain European industries. Therefore, this is a regulatory 
failure. The tension between trade and regulatory failure, which leads to many 
such dilemmas, lies at the center of all linkage issues. 
B. REGULATORY GRIEVANCE: REGULATORY FAILURE 
As indicated by their respective appellations, both the GATT 1947 
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and the new WTO (World Trade 
Organization) have located their primary institutional identity in the disposition 
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of trade issues. Thus, the priority of both institutions undoubtedly lies in the 
elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers and the improvement of market 
access. This is true despite the fact that they have taken into account, in various 
ways, social issues inevitably linked to international trade. The most conspicuous 
medium through which to address the subject of linkage can be found in the 
textual relationship between the General Obligations that represent traditional 
trade values, such as GATT Articles I (Most-Favored Nation) and III (National 
Treatment), and the General Exceptions that represent certain social values, 
such as Article XX. Yet the intensity of such linkage seems rather weak. In other 
words, an inherent pro-trade bias, which is evidenced by a dichotomy between 
general obligations and exceptions, tends to prevent social values from 
prevailing over trade values in practice. Social regulations, such as health and 
safety measures, are investigated at an inferior stage as exceptions only after those 
measures turn out to be violations of general obligations.  
Evidence of this pro-trade bias abounds. First, most social regulations are 
easily struck down as violations of the National Treatment obligation because 
the regulatory distinction that these regulations create tends inevitably to 
discriminate between “like” domestic and foreign products. For example, if the 
EU prohibits all production, distribution and marketing of genetically modified 
(“GM”) food and accordingly bans foreign imports of GM soybeans, the EU 
measure may be found to violate GATT Article III on the theory that it 
discriminates between domestic nonGM soybeans and foreign GM soybeans 
despite their similar physical characteristics as soybeans. Here, one might argue 
that the existence of a different production methodology based on regulatory 
compliance should result in a finding of dissimilarity, or “unlikeness,” to the EU 
nonGM soybeans. However, the GATT/WTO jurisprudence still maintains a 
product-oriented as opposed to process-oriented perspective on the National 
Treatment obligation. In other words, soybeans are soybeans no matter how 
they are manufactured or processed. To discriminate between these like 
products is a violation of the National Treatment obligation.58 In sum, any 
disparate impact of a social regulation on domestic and foreign “like products,” 
even impact due to legitimate regulatory distinction, results in a violation of 
GATT Article III.  
Second, the scope of general obligations such as Article III is quite far-
reaching. Article III:4 is applied to “all laws, regulations and requirements affecting 
                                                 
58  See GATT, Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna ¶¶ 5.9, 5.11–5.12, 
DS21/R–39 S/155 (Sept 3, 1991) (cited in note 2). The Tuna panel observed that even an equally 
indistinguishable measure, which applies both to imported and like domestic products in an origin-
neutral way, should be product-related in order to be subject to the interpretive note and thus 
Article III:4.  
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their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or 
use.”59 Such sweeping language as “all” and “affecting” tends to subject almost 
all social regulations to the discipline of Article III. The resulting situation is 
broadly analogous to that implicated by the affecting test in US Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.60 
Third, the general exception clause in Article XX, which represents various 
social regulations, such as protection of human health and environment, is 
incomplete. It is obsolete and deficient because it has not been amended since 
its creation in the 1940s. Indeed, certain social policy parameters articulated in 
the clause are even “anachronistically narrow,” reflecting the regulatory 
sensitivities of the era in which it was drafted,61 rather than those of the twenty-
first century.  
Fourth, based on the principle that exceptions should be interpreted 
“narrowly,”62 GATT panels have traditionally maintained interpretive rigor when 
addressing exceptions. Moreover, in construing whether such exceptions are 
“necessary” to achieve putative domestic regulatory goals, panels have devised 
draconian tests such as the “least trade restrictive” test, according to which a 
defendant (regulating state) must demonstrate that the measure in question is the 
least trade restrictive alternative imaginable. This exacting interpretive stance has 
undoubtedly discouraged the social concerns embedded in such exceptions from 
actually being embraced through GATT jurisprudence. Not surprisingly, not a 
single GATT report rendered an affirmative ruling on exceptions.63 
Nevertheless, such a sweeping pro-trade bias could not be sustained against 
the recent winds of change. First, domestic regulations have begun to receive 
greater attention. A great many domestic regulations have been issued in 
response to the popular demands of the welfare state and the novel risks 
associated with the creation of modern technology. Second, traditional trade 
policy measures—such as tariffs and quotas—have begun to vanish partly 
                                                 
59  GATT 1947, art III:4 at 490 (cited in note 1). 
60  Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US 1, 195 (1824). See Norman R. Williams, Gibbons, 79 NYU L Rev 1398, 
1415 (2004). 
61  I owe this insight to Professor Joseph H. H. Weiler. See also Mike Meier, GATT, WTO, and the 
Environment: To What Extent Do GATT/WTO Rules Permit Member Nations to Protect the Environment 
When Doing So Adversely Affects Trade?, 8 Colo J Intl Envir L & Poly 241, 281 (1997) (contending 
that the old GATT is a “relic of 1947, when economic development was the priority”). 
62  See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade 
Organization, 44 Duke L J 829, 906 n 349 (1995). 
63  See Robert Howse, Managing the Interface between International Trade Law and the Regulatory State: What 
Lessons Should (and Should Not) Be Drawn from the Jurisprudence of the United States Dormant Commerce 
Clause, in Thomas Cottier, Petros C. Mavroidis and Patrick Blatter, eds, Regulatory Barriers and the 
Principle of Non-Discrimination in World Trade Law 139, 142 (Michigan 2000). 
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because tariffs have already been lowered dramatically, and partly because 
governments have realized that the protection of certain domestic industries 
tends to be very costly, often harming the economic interests of their own 
citizens. Under these new circumstances, the original pro-trade bias, if left 
unchanged, would have failed to properly address the new status quo, thereby 
delegitimating the global trading system. 
In this connection, numerous critics have raised their voices against the 
current inability of the WTO to tackle these contemporary problems. Philip 
Nichols, for example, criticizes the deficiency of GATT Article XX exceptions 
and warns that the failure to represent the “fundamental nature of societal 
values,” such as labor, environment, and cultural identity, deprives the WTO of 
legitimacy.64 Nichols goes on to argue for creating an exception, in addition to 
Article XX, to embrace such societal values.65 From a slightly different 
perspective, Jeffrey Dunoff contends that WTO panels should not engage in any 
“trade and . . .” issues by exercising judicial caution because their decisions risk 
delegitimating the WTO as a whole due to its embedded pro-trade bias.66 Some 
scholars view the WTO as an improper venue for the arbitration of social 
regulations because it lacks necessary resources such as institutional and 
technical expertise.67 In a parallel line, Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse 
argue that “substantial national political autonomy” should be ensured in the 
domestic regulatory process even if those regulations will affect trade flows.68 
In sum, the ever increasing magnitude of social regulations in the modern 
welfare state tends to result in a perpetual cycle of angst and grievance in the 
face of the inherent pro-trade bias of the WTO and consequent incapacity of the 
WTO system to treat social regulations in an appropriate way. In the absence of 
serious efforts to incorporate due “sensitivity” to legitimate social regulatory 
concerns, the legitimacy of the WTO cannot be ensured.69 
                                                 
64  See Philip M. Nichols, Trade without Values, 90 Nw U L Rev 658, 660 (1996). 
65  Id.  
66  See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 Eur J Intl L 733, 754–57 (1999). But see 
Hannes L. Schloemann and Stefan Ohlhoff, “Constitutionalization” and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: 
National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 Am J Intl L 424, 451 (1999) (arguing that the WTO’s 
ability to overcome a “protrade bias” through the incorporation of necessary policy elements will 
be critical to its constitutionalization). 
67  See David A. Wirth, International Trade Agreements: Vehicles for Regulatory Reform?, 1997 U Chi Legal F 
331; David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines, 27 
Cornell Intl L J 817, 859 (1994) (maintaining that the WTO panels should be “highly deferential” 
to the scientific determinations of national regulatory agencies). 
68  Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, Trade Liberalization and Regulatory Diversity: Reconciling 
Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics, 6 Eur J L & Econ 5, 28 (1998).  
69  See Daniel C. Esty, The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis, 1 World Trade Rev 7, 19 (2002). 
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C. THE DEMISE OF FREE TRADE:70 TRADE FAILURE 
When confronting a legitimate regulatory concern, one might reasonably 
posit that domestic governments should be able to maintain their own regulatory 
autonomy and diversity. In other words, domestic regulations should be fully 
respected as long as they stand for legitimate objectives and are not 
protectionist. An intransigent adherence to one’s own national standards, 
however, particularly when they are unique or idiosyncratic, often gives rise to a 
de facto form of protectionism. Where national standards have been established 
for a long time or were developed in an atmosphere of consultation with 
affected domestic companies, those companies are naturally at an advantage vis-
à-vis competing foreign exporters in terms of compliance with those standards. 
Yet it is difficult to distinguish in practice between the unavoidable advantages 
accruing to domestic industries with respect to national standards and 
deliberately-designed, disguised forms of protectionism.71 
Accordingly, unless regulatory diversity or regulatory heterogeneity is 
tolerated by importing countries72 or endorsed between importing and exporting 
countries through relevant legal instruments such as mutual recognition, 
importing countries would ban the import of those products that fail to comply 
with their own national standards. Under such circumstances, regulatory 
                                                 
70  For the purpose of this article, free trade can be defined as nondiscrimination including not only 
antiprotectionism but also a status without any unjustifiable disparate impact. David Driesen warns 
that the lack of a clear legal conceptualization of “free trade” can undermine the legitimacy of the 
global trading system, and identifies three different notions of free trade: “non-discrimination,” 
“international non-coercion,” and “principle of laissez-faire government.” David M. Driesen, 
What Is Free Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking behind the Trade and Environment Debate, 41 Va J Intl L 279, 
285 (2001). Driesen observes that because of the different nuances, ramifications, and “normative 
attractiveness” that these three notions of free trade deliver in different contexts, defining free 
trade seems to be a fluid task—a task akin to the “Rorschach” test. Id at 285.  
71  See Jackson, 96 Am J Intl L at 125 (cited in note 20); WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, art XVII, ¶ 1 n 10, in The Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 325, 342 (cited in note 1) (stating that “inherent 
competitive disadvantages which result from the foreign character of the relevant services or service 
suppliers”).  
72  Bhagwati comprehensively surveyed the demands to reduce regulatory diversity among trading 
nations. Jagdish Bhagwati, The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity among Trading Nations, in 
Bhagwati and Hudec, eds, 1 Fair Trade and Harmonization at 9 (cited in note 24). From a 
philosophical viewpoint, he offered three explanations: “transborder obligations,” “distributive 
justice,” and “fairness.” Id at 9–20. Structurally speaking, “diminished giant syndrome” and 
“globalization” are factors that he considers. Id at 20–23. From an economic viewpoint, he 
highlighted that most preeminent economists observe that mutual gains from trade can still occur 
without harmonization of social regulation. Id at 23–31. From a political viewpoint, he found 
such demands in the law of “constant protection” clad with the “unfair trade” argument which 
emerged after the decline of traditional protectionist devices such as tariffs and quotas. Id at 31–
35. 
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diversity or regulatory heterogeneity is itself a source of trade barriers in the 
global dimension. Moreover, the trade-restrictive nature of domestic regulations 
tends only to intensify as national economies become more interdependent. To 
be sure, certain large multinational enterprises might be able to survive such 
regulatory heterogeneity by using economies of scale flowing from a vast global 
market share to implement multiple production lines. Yet most small and 
medium-sized enterprises cannot afford such luxuries. From the perspective of 
these smaller players, the above scenario eventuates a high degree of economic 
concentration and a corresponding massive income disparity on a global scale.  
This situation becomes more vivid still if the exporters are developing 
countries and the importers are developed countries with higher regulatory 
standards. Developing countries suffer from these higher standards mainly 
because they lack the financial and technical capability to meet highly 
sophisticated standards. Under these circumstances, nothing is gained from 
saddling developing countries with rich country standards. Still, some may argue 
for “fair” trade or a “level playing field” from the perspective of domestic 
industries in rich countries that claim to be unfairly disadvantaged when forced 
to comply with domestic standards from which foreign competitors are 
exempt.73 Similarly, some may warn against a theoretical “race to the bottom” or 
“social dumping” by which noncompliant products from developing countries 
trigger a downward competition for lower production costs among industries 
that eventually results in a deterioration of the general quality of regulatory 
protection.74 Yet to this date no significant empirical evidence has been 
produced to prove the existence of such theoretical phenomena.75  
                                                 
73  But see Jagdish Bhagwati, A Stream of Windows: Unsettling Reflections on Trade, Immigration and 
Democracy 247–68 (MIT 1998) (discussing why leveling the field is unfair in terms of comparative 
advantage).  
74  See Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, Va J Intl L 379, 464 (1996) (observing that “[t]o the extent 
the World Trade Organization translates GATT doctrine into a rigidity that consistently exalts 
trade above all other societal values, it could seriously undermine the free trade regime’s popular 
acceptance”). 
75  See, for example, John Douglas Wilson, Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards: Is There a 
Theoretical Basis for a Race to the Bottom?, in Bhagwati and Hudec, eds, 1 Fair Trade and Harmonization 
393, 423 (cited in note 24) (observing that a “race” is not a representative word depicting 
behaviors of independent governments and that this race model fails to explain the absence of 
more direct means to attract foreign firms such as subsidies or lower tax rate on capital gains); 
Arik Levinson, Environmental Regulations and Industrial Location: International and Domestic Evidence, in 
Bhagwati and Hudec, eds, 1 Fair Trade and Harmonization 429, 453 (cited in note 24) (emphasizing 
the lack of economic evidence to support that “environmental regulations harm competit[ion]”). 
See also Bhagwati, 96 Am J Intl L at 130–31 (cited in note 54); Adrienne Héritier, Christoph 
Knill, and Susanne Mingers, Ringing the Changes in Europe: Regulatory Competition and the Transformation 
of the State. Britain, France, Germany 1 (Walter de Gruyter 1996) (finding that “European clean-air 
policy is the product of regulative contest between leading member states”); David Vogel, Trading 
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Moreover, under the principle of comparative advantage, producers in rich 
countries have a much easier time complying with higher regulatory standards 
than do their counterparts in poor countries since the former enjoy higher levels 
of technology. At the same time, a perennial grievance of companies in 
developed countries—cheap imports—is less a function of the relatively higher 
compliance costs borne by producers in rich countries than of the lower labor 
costs enjoyed by producers in poor countries. This, too, seems natural according 
to the principle of comparative advantage.76 To resolve this dilemma, serious and 
sustained efforts to build the capacity of poor countries to effectively comply 
with higher social standards are required. This can be accomplished via financial 
and technical assistance from rich countries. In the absence of such intervention, 
regulatory unilateralism works to undermine free trade in the form of either 
further protectionism77 or development failure. 
D. BEYOND THE ENTROPIC DILEMMA 
At first glance, the foregoing tension between regulatory grievances 
(regulatory failure) and free trade concerns (trade failure) inevitably poses a 
profound dilemma: if one value is promoted too forcefully, any resulting 
benefits are likely to come at the expense of the other value. Indeed, the 
conventional approach to linkage has been negative, as symbolized by the use of 
such terms as “clash” or “conflict.”78 This negative perspective often leads to a 
“dialogue of the deaf” framed in terms such as “[f]ree trade versus labor 
standards” or “growth versus the environment.”79 The predictable result is at 
best a zero-sum reconciliation in which trade and nontrade values cancel or 
                                                                                                                              
Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy 6 (Harvard 1995) (discussing the so-
called “California effect,” which is an example of a “race to the top”).  
76  See David W. Leebron, Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization Claims, in Bhagwati 
and Hudec, eds, 1 Fair Trade and Harmonization 41, 71 (cited in note 24) (observing that 
“[d]ifferences in legal and policy regimes that result from differences in preferences, endowments, 
or technologies reflect differences in the optimal regime” and that “[a]ny claim of unfairness 
would seem fundamentally at odds with not only with the theory of comparative advantage, but 
also with a minimalist notion of sovereignty that allowed each nation to adopt policies that are 
best for it”).   
77  Regarding the so-called “green protectionism,” see World Trade Organization, Environment: History 
1, Early Years: emerging environment debate in GATT/WTO, available online at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/hist1_e.htm> (visited Nov 10, 2004). 
78  See Cho, Free Markets and Social Regulation at 44–45 (cited in note 56) (discussing a dilemma of 
“dual crisis”). 
79  Renato Ruggiero, A Shared Responsibility: Global Policy Coherence for Our Global Age, Address to the 
Conference on “Globalization as a Challenge for German Business; export opportunities for small and medium-
sized companies in the environmental field (Dec 9, 1997), available online at <http://www.wto.org/ 
english/news_e/sprr_e/bonn_e.htm> (visited Nov 10, 2004). 
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offset each other under clashing or conflicting circumstances. Against the 
backdrop of expanding interdependency upon the contemporary international 
trade landscape, such zero-sum effects, if allowed to become widespread, will 
undermine the global trading system by greatly reducing the net value added. 
It follows that the global trading community should take the more 
constructive step of adopting a positive perspective on linkage in order to 
transform international trade into a positive sum game. As the former WTO 
Director-General Renato Ruggiero maintains, economic growth powered by 
international trade leads to better social conditions.80 On the other hand, 
regulatory improvement tends to boost international trade through the economy 
of standardization or better “market contestability.”81 
In this regard, the global trading system has come to require a new telos 
capable of transcending the narrow purpose of antiprotection while at the same 
time connoting a much broader ideal of “integration” that ensures that both 
trade values and social values are upheld in a coherent and synergetic, rather 
than competing fashion.82 Reflecting this new teleology, the Preamble of the 
WTO Charter expresses the ideals of an “integrated, more viable and durable 
multilateral trading system” and “sustainable development,”83 which certainly go 
beyond the narrow antiprotectionist motto that was embedded in the old 
GATT. In the same context, the Doha Ministerial Declaration recently 
reaffirmed the Members’ commitment to the objective of “sustainable 
development” under which a dual goal of open markets and adequate social 
regulation must be “mutually supportive.”84 
Naturally, this new telos necessitates strengthening the free trade/social 
regulation linkage, which has hitherto been limited by the inherent pro-trade bias 
of the key structures and institutions, and mandates the development of more 
practical problem-solving attitudes in pursuit of the dual goals of free markets 
and desired social regulation. This daunting task must rely for its achievement 
not only on jurisprudence but also on institutional instruments including, but 
                                                 
80  Renato Ruggiero, Beyond the Multilateral Trading System, Address to the 20th Seminar on International 
Security, Politics and Economics Institut pour les Hautes Etudes Internationales (Apr 12, 1999), available 
online at <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sprr_e/ih_e.htm> (visited Nov 10, 2004). 
81  Compare Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, The International Contestability 
of Market–Economic Perspective: Issue Paper, TD/TC(96)5 (1996), with Geza Feketekuty, The Scope, 
Implication and Economic Rationale of a Competition-Oriented Approach to Future Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, in Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, TD/TC(96)9, 2–4 
(1996). 
82  See Cho, Free Markets and Social Regulation at 13–14 (cited in note 56). 
83  WTO Agreement, preamble, at 6 (cited in note 4). 
84  World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration: The Fourth WTO Ministerial Meeting ¶ 6, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov 20, 2001). 
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not limited, to the WTO.85 Inevitably, this process will involve a complicated 
mix of law, politics, and policies as well as the subtle allocation of powers 
exercised by different entities, including national governments and international 
institutions such as the WTO.86 This “trade constitution,”87 which is embedded 
in the very concept of linkage, also reveals a new horizon in the field of 
international trade: “distributional issues.”88 As seen in the experience of the EU, 
the effective implementation of a common social policy in a given polity, while 
minimizing any negative effect to trade, requires some kind of financial 
assistance mechanism, such as a “structural fund,” to aid less developed 
members to equip themselves with higher regulatory standards.89 
                                                 
85  But see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling International Trade with Preservation of the Global Commons: Can 
We Prosper and Protect?, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev 1407, 1421–38, 1441–50 (1992) (arguing that 
scholars should first focus on conflicting interests, such as “economic efficiency,” “sovereignty” 
and “political harmony,” underlying the trade and environment linkage before contemplating any 
institutional solution, and presenting a set of legal doctrines balancing these interests, such as 
“non-discrimination,” “proportionality,” and “relatedness”). 
86  Jackson, 96 Am J Intl L at 118 (cited in note 20). Compare Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional Linkage: 
Transcending “Trade and . . .”, 96 Am J Intl L 77, 80 (2002) (discussing “allocation of jurisdiction”). 
87  John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations 339 (MIT 
2d ed 1997); John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence 101–04 
(Royal Inst Intl Aff 1998); John H. Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U Pa J Intl 
Econ L 17, 25–28 (1996); John H. Jackson, Perspectives on Regionalism in Trade Relations, 27 L & Pol 
in Intl Bus 873 (1996). See also Antonio F. Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in 
National Security, 23 Yale J Intl L 301, 316–24 (1998) (discussing Professor Jackson’s constitutional 
premise of international trade law). Compare Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the 
WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 Pac Rim L & Poly J 1, 32, 35 (1995) (submitting a 
“targeted constitutional approach” in the trade/competition linkage under which nations retain 
the rights to “formulate and interpret” their own anticompetition laws but are subject to a certain 
international dispute resolution system when disputes “cannot be resolved in national courts or by 
the nations themselves”); James Thuo Gathii, Re-Characterizing the Social in the Constitutionalization of 
the WTO: A Preliminary Analysis, 7 Widener L Symp J 137 (2001). Although Gathii succeeds to 
“characterize” nontrade, social values as coexisting with trade values, his “preliminary analysis” 
fails to deliver further details on how to achieve this coexistence. Id at 173. Furthermore, he 
makes a fatal flaw in his analysis by equating protectionism embedded in the antidumping 
mechanism or the voluntary export restraints with avenues through which social issues can be 
addressed. See id at 170–72. Safeguard measures are the only legitimate trade-restricting avenue to 
address, temporarily and exceptionally, any social instability (dislocation and bankruptcy) caused 
by free trade in an unforeseeable way. Otherwise, it is each government’s job to cushion the 
impact of free trade using domestic, not trade, policies such as tax or adjustment programs.  
88  See Dunoff, 33 Geo Wash Intl L Rev at 1008 (cited in note 29). 
89  See William P. Alford, Introduction: The North American Free Trade Agreement and the Need for Candor, 
34 Harv Intl L J 293, 297 (1993) (observing that “substantial transfer payments” from developed 
to developing countries are necessary for the latter to implement higher regulatory standards). 
Compare Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Justice: Linking the Trade Linkage Debates, 19 U Pa J Intl Econ L 
391, 414–15 (1998) (observing, based on the premise that all linkage issues are “inescapably moral 
questions” since they are questions of “justice,” that solutions to the linkage issues depend on the 
“allocation of social goods and social burdens”). 
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Importantly, just as no constitution is static, this “trade constitution” is not 
limited in its operation by a priori restraints or predetermined competence limits 
of the type that would oblige the WTO to avoid engagement in certain issue 
areas.90 In fact, the “boundaries” of international organizations have always been 
flexible.91 This is especially so wherever one encounters an international 
organization with an evolving telos. Taken to an extreme, emphasis on flexibility 
could lead some to conclude that the mandate of the WTO should be expanded 
to cover such areas as labor and the environment, thereby institutionalizing an 
inseparable relationship between trade and social values.92 Following this line of 
thought, some scholars argue for greater horizontality and seamlessness in rule 
design in international economic law.93 Yet, the WTO is a trade organization, and 
it should reconcile and manage the tension between free markets and social 
regulations from the standpoint of a trade organization. Of course, this premise 
is by no means to maintain or revive the pro-trade bias in terms of reconciliation 
or management of the tension. Rather, it means that the WTO should contribute 
to the constructive harmonization of trade and social values without losing its 
institutional identity and capacity as a trade organization, while leaving adequate 
room for cooperation with other sector-specific international regulatory agencies 
such as the International Labor Organization (“ILO”) and the United Nations 
Environmental Program (“UNEP”).94 
In sum, international trade law defines linkage as “trade and labor” or 
“trade and environment,” not as “labor and trade” or “environment and trade,” 
respectively.95 International trade law cannot share the same basis with the 
                                                 
90  Jackson, 96 Am J Intl L at 120–22 (cited in note 20). 
91  Alvarez, 96 Am J Intl L at 149 (cited in note 16). Compare Peter M. Haas and Ernst B. Haas, 
Learning to Learn: Some Thoughts on Improving International Governance of the Global Problematique, in 
Ingvar Carlsson and Shridath Rampal, Issues in Global Governance: Papers Written for the Commission on 
Global Governance 295, 314 (Kluwer 1995) (introducing the concept of the “learning” international 
organization, which “redefine[s] [its] missions in light of new interdependencies”); Charnovitz, 96 
Am J Intl L at 53 (cited in note 25).  
92  See Garcia, 19 U Pa J Intl Econ L at 425 (cited in note 89) (discussing “Integrated View”); Gathii, 
7 Widener L Symp J at 137–38 (cited in note 87); Bronckers, 4 J Intl Econ L at 53–56 (cited in 
note 45). 
93  See Pierre Sauvé and Americo Beviglia Zampetti, Subsidiarity Perspectives on the New Trade Agenda, 3 J 
Intl Econ L 83, 104 (2000). 
94  See Bronckers, 4 J Intl Econ L at 49–53 (cited in note 45) (discussing “external co-operation” 
between the WTO and specialized international regulatory agencies such as the ILO). Compare 
Georg Schwarzenberger, The Frontiers of International Law 306 (Stevens and Sons 1962) (insightfully 
observing that international cooperation in diverse economic and social issues tends to necessitate 
an “expansion in existing international institutions and the creation of new agencies”). 
95  But see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, From Green to Global: Toward the Transformation of International 
Environmental Law, 19 Harv Envtl L Rev 241, 281–88 (1995) (exploring various linkage issues from 
the standpoint of international environmental law). 
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UNEP or ILO even when the WTO addresses putative linkage issues. To ignore 
its own institutional identity would be politically fatal and practically ineffective. 
After all, the WTO is not, and should not try to become, a form of World 
Government of the sort that might arguably be in a better position to fully 
federalize linkage issues. 
IV. TOWARD A SYNERGISTIC LINKAGE: A MULTIFACETED 
APPROACH 
A. LINKAGE CONTINUUM 
Any credible attempt to achieve a synergistic linkage from the standpoint 
of the WTO must proceed from the realization that the linkage phenomenon is 
in most cases a matter of degree and that the way in which it is addressed should 
accordingly be understood not as a binary choice but as a spectrum of options. As 
discussed above, an antinomian stance toward either extreme, in other words, 
free trade versus regulatory unilateralism, would continue to create unnecessary 
tensions out of linkage, instead of mitigating or eliminating them.  
Linkage can be achieved in many different ways, as circumstances merit. 
For instance, although GM food has recently commanded enormous legal and 
political attention within the global trading system, this linkage of trade and 
human health (or the environment) can be handled from totally different 
perspectives with totally different results. As the US has recently sued the EU 
for the latter’s highly controversial moratorium on the approval of GM food, 
this controversy may end up being adjudicated in the WTO dispute settlement 
system.96 Alternatively, under a more constructive atmosphere a certain guideline 
as to administration and marketing of GM food could be issued to Members as a 
result of a joint effort by the Committee on Trade and Environment and the 
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Similarly, this issue could be 
discussed and deliberated in a functional and professional fashion under a 
surveillance mechanism such as the Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
(“TPRM”).97 Or, in a much bolder though as yet implausible move, the WTO 
Members could agree on a new side agreement concerning this issue in 
cooperation with the World Health Organization or the United Nation 
Environmental Program. In each scenario, one can perceive a wide spectrum of 
options yielding varying degrees of trade and environmental protection. 
                                                 
96  See Response of the United States to the Questions by the Panel Pertaining to the Request of the 
European Communities for a Preliminary Ruling, European Communities–Measures Affecting the 
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WTO Doc No WT/DS291/23 (Mar 29, 2003). 
97  See WTO Agreement, Annex 3, Trade Policy Review Mechanism, in The Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 434 (cited in note 1) (hereinafter TPRM). 
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Critically, a different matrix of legal, political, and institutional stakes is 
employed in each scenario, and it is this subtle matrix of interests that ultimately 
determines the final destiny of the linkage in each particular scenario. 
Admittedly, political stakes rank very high in any linkage matrix.98 Joel 
Trachtman, for example, regards the decision to link trade to other issues as 
essentially political.99 According to this view, law or economics should play 
supplementary roles in demonstrating various possibilities and consequences 
that each linkage might bring.100 In the final stage, individuals and states should 
decide the issue through a political process consisting of the assessment of 
different scenarios and the expression of competing preferences.101 According to 
this view, linkage problems should ultimately be addressed through such 
legislative measures as treaties or agreements.102 At the same time, however, 
many other tools and fora exist in the global trading system that are not 
necessarily political in themselves but are nonetheless capable of providing 
practical and functional solutions to linkage-related issues. For example, certain 
aspects of trade and environment linkage have been addressed via the 
GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism not in a political but in a (quasi-) 
judicial manner.103 Or, a variety of epistemic committees and similar avenues 
under the auspices of international institutions could explore linkage issues in an 
apolitical and functional fashion, thereby providing policymakers whose 
everyday regulatory decisions are based on linkage considerations with 
opportunities for the exchange of information and professional deliberation.104  
                                                 
98  See Steger, 96 Am J Intl L at 135 (cited in note 10); Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy—
And Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 Am J Intl L 94, 116–17 (2002); 
Charnovitz, 96 Am J Intl L at 30 (cited in note 25); Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the 
WTO, 45 Harv Intl L J 303, 307–08 (2004); Chantal Thomas, Should the World Trade Organization 
Incorporate Labor and Environmental Standards?, 61 Wash & Lee L Rev 347, 388–91 (2004). 
99  Trachtman, 96 Am J Intl L at 77 (cited in note 86). 
100  Id. 
101  Id. 
102  See, for example, Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future (Inst for Intl 
Econ 1994) (arguing for the establishment of a new international environmental organization); 
Dunoff, 19 Harv Envir L Rev at 257 (cited in note 95) (espousing such organization for different 
reasons). But see Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization under Challenge: Democracy and the 
Law and Politics and of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 Harv Envir L Rev 1, 
84–93 (2001) (viewing the creation of such organization as ineffective on the ground that it would 
still fail to address disparities between and within the US and the EU). 
103  See GATT Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R - 39 S/155 
(Sept 3, 1991) (cited in note 2); World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United 
States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc No WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr 
29, 1996); World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc No WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct 12, 1998).  
104  See Subsection IV.A.4 in this Article.  
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B. MULTIFACETED LIST OF OPTIONS 
1. Jurisprudence 
The well-developed dispute settlement mechanism that has been operating 
since the birth of the old GATT 1947 is one of the main engines for addressing 
linkages. As Daniel Farber and Robert Hudec observe, GATT can offer fairly 
“workable” solutions in reconciling the tension between trade and social 
concerns such as environmental protection by distinguishing “bona fide 
regulation” from “protectionism.”105 Panels and the Appellate Body have 
engaged in the adjudication of numerous cases at the intersection of trade and 
social regulations. Most of these cases involve various social regulations relating 
to health or environmental concerns that result in some type of incidental 
restriction on international trade. Therefore, the analysis of panels (or the 
Appellate Body) centers on the interpretation of general obligations that 
enshrine free trade, such as Articles I (Most-Favored Nation), III (National 
Treatment) and XI (Market Access), as well as exceptions that represent certain 
overriding social values, such as Article XX (General Exception). 
Yet in the old GATT era, when a pro-trade bias was clearly evident, panels 
focused on the “content” of a given domestic regulation in their judicial review. 
This often resulted in a presumptive conclusion that the measure in question 
was not “necessary” or even rationally “related” to the attainment of the social 
values of the regulating state. This second-guessing or negation of legitimate 
policy objectives often infuriated domestic policymakers and thus diminished 
their perception of GATT’s legitimacy. For instance, a panel struck down the 
Thai government’s ban on the importation of foreign cigarettes despite its 
legitimate health concerns, which even the WHO supported, on the sole ground 
that a more trade-friendly solution theoretically could have been found.106 
However, under the new WTO system the Appellate Body has directed its 
interpretive focus to the “manner” in which a given domestic regulation is 
applied, and not to the regulation’s substance. In its jurisprudence, the Appellate 
Body has tried to scrutinize on a case-by-case basis whether a given domestic 
regulation was applied consistently and evenhandedly or whether it respected 
fundamental principles of law, rather than reinvestigating, on its own accord, 
whether the regulation’s substance was necessary or related to the achievement 
                                                 
105  Daniel A. Farber and Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on Domestic Environmental Regulations, 
in Bhagwati and Hudec, eds, 2 Fair Trade and Harmonization 59, 80–85 (cited in note 13). 
106  GATT, Report of the Panel, Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes ¶¶ 
52–53, 55–56, GATT BISD DS10/R–37S/200 (Nov 7, 1990). See David P. Fidler, Neither Science 
Nor Shamans: Globalization of Markets and Health in the Developing World, 7 Ind J Global Legal Studies 
191, 200–01 (1999) (criticizing the Thai Cigarette panel report). 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 652 Vol. 5 No. 2 
of the regulating state’s social policy goals. In fact, Farber and Hudec predicted 
with brilliant insight that future debates on linkage should prioritize regulatory 
processes over substantive regulations themselves because a “clean doctrinal 
solution” tends to be hard to achieve in the face of sophisticated regulations 
positioned along a wide spectrum of legitimate and protectionist objectives.107 
Thus, in United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 
(“Gasoline”), the Appellate Body upheld the legitimacy of the US environmental 
policy toward clean air, but condemned its lack of effort during the regulatory 
process to reduce administrative requirements that resulted in a heavier 
compliance burden for foreign refiners.108 Likewise, in the famed United States—
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (“Shrimp-Turtle”) case, the 
Appellate Body sympathized with the regulatory goals of US Section 609109 (in 
other words, protection of endangered species such as sea turtles), but criticized 
flaws in its implementation process, such as the denial of due process, that 
ultimately hurt foreign shrimpers.110 The result of this new test was to safeguard 
the Members’ regulatory autonomy by providing ample regulatory leeway for 
domestic regulators. Under this new test, even if a measure turned out to be a 
violation, the outcome was not catastrophic but merely suspensive or 
provisional, demanding only a change of application, rather than repeal of the 
offending statute. When the US lost the Shrimp-Turtle case, for example, it was 
not forced to change its domestic statute, Section 609, but only its application.111 
This invention of a new doctrinal test, which constitutes further evidence 
of the transformation of the telos of the global trading system,112 is premised on 
the chapeau of Article XX. The text of the chapeau is vague, consisting of 
nonspecific terms such as “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” and 
“disguised restriction.” Under the old GATT, this preambular text attracted little 
attention, resulting in a minimal amount of case law that was limited to 
                                                 
107  Farber and Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on Domestic Environmental Regulations at 85 (cited in note 
105). 
108  World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline 27, WTO Doc No WT/DS2/9 (May 20, 1996). 
109  Pub L No 101-161, codified at 16 USC § 1537 (1994). 
110  World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products ¶ 181, WTO Doc No WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct 12, 1998) (cited in 
note 103). 
111  USTR, Press Release: WTO Appellate Body Found US Sea Turtle Law Meets WTO Criteria But Faults US 
Implementation (Oct 12, 1998) (emphasizing that the US law (Section 609) had been left intact by 
the Report). 
112  Cho, Free Markets and Social Regulation at 12–15 (cited in note 56). 
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expounding its lexicographical meaning.113 Yet the Appellate Body, through its 
teleological creation of a new doctrinal test, managed to invest the text with new 
meaning. This judicial innovation holds significant implications for the linkage 
debate. Most importantly, its “process-oriented” hermeneutics results in the 
creation of a synergistic space in which both trade and social values can be 
simultaneously upheld.114 
As significant as it may be from the perspective of linkage theory, the 
Appellate Body’s teleological interpretation is applicable only when a particular 
domestic regulation falls within the rubric of the “exhaustive” list contained in 
Article XX. As mentioned above, this list is incomplete and even anachronistic. 
A number of significant modern regulatory concerns such as consumer 
protection, labor, or anticompetition do not appear on the list. Consequently, 
the question is whether panels or the Appellate Body should accept for review 
cases involving regulations not expressly covered by the GATT/WTO, such as 
those regarding labor and consumer protection. From a judicial standpoint, 
certain methods can be conceived whereby interventions in such cases can be 
justified. 
The first method involves returning to Article III and redeeming legitimate 
social regulations before they are justified under Article XX. In other words, if a 
certain regulation is nonprotectionist and thus legitimate, it can be deemed 
consistent with Article III in the first instance. This approach, which is dubbed 
the “aim and effect” test,115 was implicated in the recent debate on PPMs.116 The 
                                                 
113  Under the GATT, very few cases involved the chapeau. See General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (Organization), Guide to GATT Law and Practice: Analytical Index 563–65 (Geneva 6th ed 
1994). 
114  McGinnis and Movsesian also advocate the use of “procedure-oriented” jurisprudence 
highlighting “transparency,” “performance-orientation,” and “consistency” but only to the extent 
that it strikes down covertly protectionist measures and eventually realizes a Madisonian vision of 
democracy. John O. McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 Harv L 
Rev 511, 573–83 (2000). See also Deborah Z. Cass, The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade 
Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade, 12 Eur J 
Intl L 39 (2001) (arguing that the WTO tribunal engages in “judicial constitutionalization” by 
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Effects” Test, 32 Intl Law 619 (1998). See also GATT, Report of the Panel, United States—Taxes on 
Automobiles ¶ 5.10, WTO Doc No DS31/R (Oct 11, 1994); GATT, Report of the Panel, United 
States—Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverage ¶¶ 5.71–5.72, WTO Doc No DS23/R, GATT 
BISD (39S/206) (June 19, 1992); World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, 
European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas ¶ 216, WTO Doc 
No WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept 9, 1997) (ruling against the “aim and effect” test). 
116  See, for example, Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the 
Myth of Illegality, 27 Yale J Intl L 59 (2002); Robert Howse and Donald Regan, The Product/Process 
Distinction—An Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy, 11 Eur J Intl L 249 (2000); 
 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 654 Vol. 5 No. 2 
term PPM, for “Processes and Production Method,” stands for a variety of 
regulations concerning the way in which products are manufactured or 
processed.117 Under conventional trade rules, most PPMs constitute prima facie 
violations of Article III because they discriminate between similar products on 
the basis of regulatory compliance. For example, a domestic regulation banning 
the importation of pelts from animals caught in leg-hold traps—which could be 
regarded as cruel—would constitute a violation of the National Treatment 
obligation because the ban discriminates between foreign leg-hold pelts and 
domestic non-leg-hold pelts.118 Because the protection of animal welfare is not 
found in Article XX, such regulations cannot be justified under a strict reading 
of Article XX. Even if such a regulation were justified under Article XX, critics 
argue that such a justification doctrine would impose an “unwarranted legal 
burden” on the achievement of legitimate social values, since the regulation in 
question was justified only after being condemned as a violation of Article III. 
Therefore, such critics contend that regulatory distinctions grounded in 
legitimate policy objectives should be found to be consistent with Article III 
without any further need for Exception Clause analysis. 
Admittedly, advocates of PPMs may earn plaudits among certain 
constituencies for defying the pro-trade bias resulting from the dichotomy 
between the general obligations and exceptions embedded in GATT. To them, 
any legitimate social concern should be accorded a status equal to that of trade 
concerns by being redeemed in the first instance—at the level of Article III 
analysis—without the stigma associated with violation and redemption at the 
inferior stage of exceptionization. Yet the flaw in this argument is that if PPMs 
are allowed to go unchecked, the proliferation of regulatory protectionism and 
unilateralism is likely to follow.119 Put simply, it is far too easy for idiosyncratic 
regulations, even where they are nonprotectionist in intent, to create trade 
barriers, unless they are subjected to the doctrinal discipline of Article XX.120  
                                                                                                                              
John H. Jackson, Comments on Shrimp/Turtle and the Product/Process Distinction, 11 Eur J Intl L 303 
(2000). 
117  See OECD, Processes and Production Methods (PPMs): Conceptual Framework and Considerations on Use of 
PPM-Based Trade Measures, available online at <http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1997doc.nsf/ 
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Economic Relations: The Public Morals of GATT’s Article XX(a) and “Conventional” Rules of 
Interpretation, 7 Minn J Global Trade 75 (1998). 
119  See Bhagwati, 96 Am J Intl L at 133 (cited in note 54) (maintaining that Tuna’s anti-PPM tradition 
should be respected because to allow countries to exclude products on PPM grounds, in 
particular moral grounds, would be “opening a real Pandora’s box”).  
120  See Charnovitz, 27 Yale J Intl Law at 62–63 (cited in note 116) (raising the possibility of “eco-
imperialism”).  
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McGinnis and Movsesian’s “antidiscrimination model” comes close to the 
above position. This model advocates adjudication over legislation in addressing 
linkage issues on the grounds that the former secures regulatory autonomy and 
diversity and that it is less vulnerable to regulatory capture.121 Its central concern 
is “antiprotectionism,” and it focuses particularly on disguised patterns of 
discrimination such as “covert protectionism,” which are expressly aimed at 
legitimate policy objectives, such as protection of health or the environment, but 
which in practice impose burdens on competing importers.122 Since 
protectionism is, according to McGinnis and Movsesian, the only evil that the 
WTO should be concerned with expelling, they argue that the WTO should 
leave intact all other scopes of regulations such as those serving “bona fide 
public welfare function” regulations.123 According to this view, the WTO should 
tolerate any kind of trade-restrictive regulation as long as it is nonprotectionist. 
No matter what kind of disparate impact such regulation may have on free trade, 
it is not the WTO’s business to remedy it.  
The flaws in this approach are readily apparent because most of today’s 
nontariff barriers tend to be based in arguably legitimate policy objectives. In 
fact, the current WTO jurisprudence concerns mainly nonprotectionist, yet still 
trade-restrictive regulations. In both the Gasoline (1996) and Shrimp-Turtle (1998) 
cases, for example, the Appellate Body explicitly endorsed the legitimacy of the 
US’s environmental regulations. Where the US encountered trouble was with 
respect to the “chapeau test,” under which the regulation as applied was found to 
jeopardize the interests of trading partners by omitting certain important 
procedural steps including hearing or consultation. This was so despite its 
legitimate, nonprotectionist environmental objectives. Not surprisingly, 
McGinnis and Movsesian neglect to take the “chapeau test” seriously in 
documenting the WTO’s early jurisprudential record.124 As a corollary, they fault 
the Appellate Body’s emphasis on the “duty to negotiate” as a departure from 
their antiprotectionist model.125 This narrow stance would not only exempt most 
contemporary nontariff barriers from scrutiny, but also neglect an important 
opportunity to build the very “world trade constitution” that they advocate for 
this increasingly interdependent global economic setting.  
A second method for justifying panel or Appellate Body intervention with 
respect to social regulations not traditionally covered by Article XX is to expand 
the interpretive reach of those provisions so as to accommodate social concerns 
                                                 
121  McGinnis and Movsesian, 114 Harv L Rev at 566–72 (cited in note 114). 
122  Id at 549–50. 
123  Id at 573. 
124  Id at 589–94. 
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beyond those explicitly enumerated. The meaning of Paragraph (a), which 
protects “public morals,” is extensive and considerably inferential. The above 
example of leg-hold traps could potentially be addressed under this paragraph.126 
Similarly, Paragraph (d) recognizes an exception to secure compliance with or 
enforce any domestic regulation as long as its objectives are consistent with the 
WTO rules. Nonetheless, some would argue that a panel or the Appellate Body 
should, upon encountering a case linking trade to regulatory issues not covered 
by Article XX, simply refuse to adjudicate such cases because there is no 
relevant substantive law. Therefore, the argument is that a panel or the Appellate 
Body should avoid such cases in the first place by casting the non liquet excuse. 
Yet others might offer the counterargument that such a narrow and positivistic 
stance amounts to a “denial of justice” because it advocates the effective 
abdication of an adjudicative body’s basic duty to resolve disputes and render 
justice.127 This opposing view argues for the use of “general principles of law” to 
fill in or supplement such lacunae.128 Indeed, most international law scholars 
claim that “there is no room for non liquet in international adjudication because 
there are no lacunae in international law.”129 
In a departure from these positivistic or naturalistic understandings of 
international law, Joel Trachtman contends that the general exception clause of 
GATT Article XX should be employed to address such non liquet situations.130 
He maintains that the provisions of Article XX should be deemed 
“standards”—which are stipulated intentionally in a flexible way that permits 
broad room for interpretation under the premise of “incomplete contracts”—
rather than “rule[s],”—which are specified a priori in a manner that leaves little 
room for interpretation.131 Accordingly, Trachtman contends that tensions 
arising from linkage issues should be resolved through these standards under 
Article XX.132 Yet other scholars, including Debra Steger, oppose the stretching 
of Article XX language on the ground that it would give too much power to 
                                                 
126  See Feddersen, 7 Minn J Global Trade at 75 (cited in note 118). 
127  See H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law 68–69 (Longmans, Green 
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129  Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Settlement Resolution, 40 Harv Intl L J 333, 341 
(1999), quoting Prosper Weil, "The Court Cannot Conclude Definitively . . .": Non Liquet Revisited, 36 
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130  See Trachtman, 40 Harv Intl L J at 346–69 (cited in note 129). 
131  Id. Regarding more discussions on rules and standards within the context of international trade 
law, see Joel P. Trachtman, International Trade as a Vector in Domestic Regulatory Reform: Discrimination, 
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quasi-judicial bodies.133 Based on her belief that linkage issues should be 
addressed only in political terms, she prefers the amendment of Article XX to 
accommodate contemporary regulatory concerns.134 
A third method is for panels and the Appellate Body to refer to other 
bodies of international law, such as multilateral environmental agreements or 
labor conventions, in adjudicating linkage issues not covered by Article XX. This 
approach is based on the proposition that the WTO should be an open system 
rather than one that is closed and “self-contained.”135 WTO law should be 
exposed to other disciplines of international law because WTO law is an 
“important part of the larger system of public international law.”136 David 
Palmeter and Petros Mavroidis contend that the WTO tribunal’s terms of 
reference under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) Article 7137 
should be interpreted to permit panels and the Appellate Body to employ 
general sources of public international law, such as custom and general 
principles of law, under Article 38 of the Statute of International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”).138 Furthermore, they take the view that the WTO tribunal should 
embrace, as sources of law, non-WTO international agreements when they are 
referred to or incorporated in the WTO’s covered agreements.139 
In a similar context, Hudec focuses on a number of multilateral 
environmental agreements (“MEAs”) that contain explicit or implicit trade 
restrictions to achieve putative goals such as protection of endangered species or 
regulation of substances that deplete the ozone layer, and that could 
consequently be regarded to be in conflict with GATT/WTO rules.140 Hudec 
argues that if all disputants are signatories of such MEAs, then any trade 
                                                 
133  Steger, 96 Am J Intl L at 144 (cited in note 10). 
134  Id at 140, 144. 
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such an attempt would eventually undermine the legitimacy of the WTO. Alvarez, 7 Widener L 
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of Disputes, art 7, in The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 
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138  Palmeter and Mavroidis, 92 Am J Intl L at 399 (cited in note 136). 
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Relates to Other Rules of International Law 456–72 (Cambridge 2003) (viewing that the applicable law 
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restrictions authorized thereunder can be interpreted as constituting a “waiver” 
of any inconsistent GATT obligations under the principle of lex posterior or lex 
specialis.141 At the same time, Hudec acknowledges that a GATT violation is 
inevitable where those trade restrictions are imposed on a WTO Member that is 
not a signatory of the MEAs.142 To remedy this situation, he proposes the 
establishment of an independent exception for such restrictions modeled after 
GATT Article XX(h), which endorses trade restrictions arising in pursuit of 
obligations set forth in certain international commodity agreements.143 
Nonetheless, the latter proposal seems difficult to achieve, at least for the time 
being, in view of the rather narrow scope of the relevant Doha agenda, which 
mandates that “[t]he negotiations shall be limited in scope to the applicability of 
such existing WTO rules as among parties to the MEA in question.”144 
By contrast, certain other scholars reject this approach on the ground that 
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism should be used only within the context 
of covered agreements explicitly incorporated in the WTO Agreement.145 
Trachtman, for example, maintains that the mandate of the WTO dispute 
settlement system is to directly apply “only WTO law.”146 He predicates this 
argument on several Dispute Settlement Understanding provisions, including 
Article 3(2) providing that “[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB [Dispute 
Settlement Body] cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided 
in the covered agreements.”147 He also takes the view that this text would 
amount to an absurdity if rights and obligations from other international treaties 
were to be applied.148 Nonetheless, Trachtman leaves the door open for the 
WTO to reference other bodies of international law either through adopting an 
interpretive method that avoids conflict with other treaties, as in the “Charming 
Betsy” doctrine,149 or by incorporating them indirectly based on Article XX.150 
The fourth method involves judicial restraint, which is analogous to the 
“political question” doctrine in certain domestic jurisdictions. For instance, a 
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GATT panel report, albeit one that was unadopted, refused to adjudicate a case 
involving a regional trading agreement under GATT Article XXIV on the 
ground that the “examination—or re-examination—of Article XXIV 
agreements was the responsibility of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.” 151 In a 
practical sense, it might be advisable to avoid certain highly “political” cases that 
could be addressed in an out-of-court setting or deferred to domestic 
governments. If highly controversial cases of this type were to be 
overadjudicated under the WTO, the inevitable political backlash could do 
severe damage to its still frail legal integrity. As Alvarez trenchantly observes, 
certain “fundamentally political issues” should not be simply turned over to the 
WTO jurisprudence without a “political consensus.”152 Reflecting similar 
concerns, the European Court of Justice has shown great deference in 
addressing certain domestic regulations marked by strong “socio-cultural 
characteristics.” Admittedly, it would be difficult for a panel or the Appellate 
Body to refuse to adjudicate a case before it without a reason. To avoid 
needlessly placing it in this position, Members should exercise forbearance 
rather than testing the WTO dispute settlement system by filing highly 
politicized or scandalized cases.  
These four methods possess both pros and cons, and it would be 
imprudent to apply any one of them mechanically without due regard to a 
particular linkage issue’s specific circumstances. Overall, the first method—the 
“aim and effect” test—carries serious risks considering its potential for abuse or 
misuse, notwithstanding the fact that many scholars and government officials 
continue to embrace its logic, as seen in the recent Asbestos case.153 Similarly, it 
seems that the fourth method—judicial restraint—would not only be difficult 
for a panel or the Appellate Body to accept but also risky considering the high 
potential for political backlash from governments and NGOs pursuing 
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regulatory goals that may be characterized by a strongly moralistic streak. In 
contrast, the second and third methods—expanding the interpretive reach of 
provisions and drawing on other bodies of international law—are practicable if 
employed with due caution. Given the extreme difficulty associated with 
mobilizing sufficient political capital to actually amend GATT Article XX, 
reliance upon some type of judicial innovation seems inevitable. For instance, in 
Shrimp-Turtle, the Appellate Body succeeded in enhancing its adjudicative 
credibility by formulating a teleological, evolutionary approach to interpreting 
“exhaustible natural resources” under GATT Article XX(g) to include 
endangered species such as sea turtles.154 Yet the main challenge to continued 
judicial innovation lies in the question of whether subtle and nuanced panels and 
the Appellate Body will prove both willing and able to move in this direction to 
address the linkage cases that come before them. Only time and experience will 
tell.  
Notwithstanding the potential availability of these four methods, the 
bottom line is that the development of a synergistic solution to the linkage 
problem within the traditional GATT framework will require still other 
resources and innovations, due partly to the inherent pro-trade dichotomy 
discussed above, and partly to the lacunae of Article XX, among other concerns. 
Accordingly, our task requires us to look beyond GATT jurisprudence to 
discover additional resources in other parts of the WTO system, such as in the 
side agreements: for example, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (“SPS”) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers on Trade (“TBT”).  
2. Harmonization 
A number of scholars have sought to tackle linkage issues more directly 
and systematically than through jurisprudence. These scholars advocate the use 
of legislation (treaty making) for the purpose of harmonizing diverse sector-
specific social regulations. In a rather bold example of this general approach, 
Andrew Guzman proposes to use the legislative process to address linkage 
issues—in other words, to accommodate nontrade issues such as labor and 
competition—within the WTO. First, Guzman proposes that a number of 
separate “departments” for major linkage areas be created within the existing 
structure of the WTO. These departments, an example of which might be a so-
called “trade and labor departments,” would conduct specialized negotiations in 
the form of “departmental rounds.”155 These would, in turn, be followed by 
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“Mega-Rounds” in which cross-departmental bargains could be made.156 
Through this process Guzman envisions the emergence of WTO agreements on 
labor or competition policy that would be patterned after the TRIPs 
Agreement.157 In its maximal form, Guzman’s expansionist vision would effect 
the transformation of the WTO into a “World Economic Organization.”158  
Yet Guzman’s ambitious proposal is vulnerable to a number of criticisms. 
First is the issue of money. Even if one assumes that Members will be able to 
secure the necessary political capital, will they be able to afford the huge 
financial and human resources needed to establish such departments? The 
budget forecast on this point seems especially gloomy when one considers that 
the WTO’s total budget is currently less than the travel budget of the IMF.159  
Second, Guzman seems to rely heavily on the success of the Uruguay 
Round, especially on the creation of TRIPs. However, it should be remembered 
that the Uruguay Round’s “single package” deal was possible mainly because it 
reflected the principle of “comparative advantage” between the North and the 
South. In other words, the South was willing to tolerate new accords relating to 
services and intellectual property, areas in which the North holds a comparative 
advantage, in exhange for further liberalization in the area of agriculture and 
textiles, in which the South holds its own comparative advantage. By contrast, 
Guzman’s regulatory bargaining scheme is based not on such a principled 
trajectory but on blatant quid pro quo deals that tend to favor politically powerful 
countries. Yet what if a Member has nothing to offer? Is it realistic to assume 
that such a Member would actually be excluded from the bargaining process, as 
Guzman’s approach would seem to suggest? Would that be a desirable result? 
And what about the reality that small, poor countries have very few personnel 
and other resources to devote to these complicated bargains?160  
Third, the “regulatory model,” which attempts to harmonize or 
universalize regulatory standards within the WTO, has proven vulnerable to 
attack on many fronts. In addressing the problem of covert protectionism, for 
example, McGinnis and Movsesian reject the regulatory model on the following 
grounds: universal regulatory standards do not fit all countries, it is vulnerable to 
capture by powerful interest groups, regulatory competition is desirable, 
universal standards are likely to result in a race to the bottom, and international 
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spillover disputes exceed the institutional capacity as well as the legitimacy of the 
WTO.161 McGinnis and Movsesian do view reciprocal bargaining as the “engine” 
of the WTO regime in that it yields incentives for free trade supporters to 
counteract protectionist groups in the domestic political dynamics.162 Moreover, 
they attribute the success of the Uruguay Round to its structure as a single 
undertaking in which North and South were able to engage in such reciprocal 
bargaining.163 Yet in contrast to “political bargaining,” they object to “regulatory 
bargains” in the context of regulatory models such as that proposed by Guzman 
on the ground that it is too vulnerable to interest group capture, among other 
concerns.164 
Fourth, Guzman’s approach seeks to take advantage of the well-
functioning WTO dispute settlement system in order to enhance the level of 
compliance with regulatory agreements. Yet apart from the daunting logistical 
challenges associated with finding qualified experts, Guzman’s approach would 
inundate the WTO system with a category of disputes highly resistant to 
settlement. For instance, what if certain poor countries repeatedly violated 
regulatory agreements due to a lack of financial and technical capability? It does 
not seem realistic or even prudent to resolve such cases in an adjudicative mode. 
Indeed, if Member countries anticipate the prospect of adjudication in the 
future, their levels of commitment to and concessions in the negotiating process 
are likely to be low. 
Chantal Thomas takes a rather eclectic position vis-à-vis Guzman’s 
approach. Although he also prioritizes legislation over adjudication in addressing 
linkage issues, particularly labor and environmental protection, Thomas 
acknowledges that legislation in the form of separate, stand-alone agreements 
carries in its negotiation process certain costs and risks—including “specification 
costs” incurred in determining “core” labor or environmental standards as well 
as “capture” and “strategic holdout.”165 Thomas’s response to these problems is 
a softer form of legislation: an amendment of the list of general exceptions 
under GATT Article XX to incorporate certain international labor and 
environmental principles.166 Notwithstanding its comparatively modest 
dimensions, Thomas’ approach still seems unworkable considering that it is 
nearly as difficult to secure an amendment under the WTO system as it is to 
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produce new legislation.167 Moreover, an amendment carries the same costs and 
risks as stand-alone legislative agreements in that WTO Members would still 
need to agree on which principles should be referenced in Article XX. The devil 
is always in the details. 
By contrast, harmonization under the WTO can be achieved more 
effectively through preexisting built-in legislative arrangements than through the 
creation of new ones. The WTO system has already launched two important side 
agreements, the SPS168 and the TBT,169 in order to supplement and complement 
GATT—particularly Article XX. The Preamble of SPS states that it desires to 
“elaborate rules for the application of the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate 
to the use of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions of 
Article XX(b).”170 Likewise, the Preamble of TBT states that it desires to “further 
the objectives of GATT 1994.”171 The most distinctive feature in these two 
agreements vis-à-vis GATT is an absence of the type of dichotomy that 
characterized GATT’s pro-trade bias. The preambles of both agreements 
emphasize that no Members should be prevented from taking necessary measures 
to protect social values such as human health or the environment. Moreover, 
these legitimate regulatory concerns are no longer marginalized as mere 
“exceptions,” but have been redefined as “rights.” For instance, SPS Article 2 
specifies that Members have the right to take sanitary measures necessary for the 
protection of human health. At the same time, both agreements overcome the 
lacunae in GATT Article XX by providing for an extensive and flexible clause 
dealing with legitimate regulatory objectives. In other words, SPS applies to all 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, which are defined broadly in Annex A of 
the WTO Agreement. In the same context, TBT covers technical regulations 
adopted pursuant to any legitimate policy objective.  
Although they grant enhanced status to social regulatory concerns, it 
cannot be argued that these agreements are biased in favor of them. Rather, they 
prudently provide many obligations related to free trade considerations in order 
to avoid such bias. Therefore, while they emphasize the rights of Members to 
take necessary regulations to achieve their legitimate policy objectives, the 
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agreements also stipulate that such regulations “do not create unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade”172 and that they remain “subject to the 
requirement that [they] are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.”173 In addition, both 
agreements contain numerous provisions, many of which are similar to those of 
GATT. The subtle equilibrium between trade and social concerns featured in 
these agreements constitutes a major improvement over GATT, which to this 
day retains a lingering pro-trade bias due to the structural dichotomy discussed 
above. 
Harmonization, which is the basic approach that both SPS and TBT 
employ in dealing with linkage, is a positive prescription. In this sense it 
contrasts with the negative prescription observed in the jurisprudence related to 
GATT Articles III and XX. Whereas the latter focuses on negative obligations 
that prohibit discrimination and other market access restrictions, the former 
concerns positive obligations that aim at the assimilation or convergence of 
substantive or procedural aspects of different domestic regulations. Normally, 
harmonization connotes legislative initiatives on substantive regulations or 
standards.174 In this respect, both SPS and TBT encourage Members to align 
their domestic regulations in various ways to internationally recognized 
standards. Because these international standards, no matter how representative 
they may be in certain specific regulatory sectors, are adopted outside the WTO, 
they are nonbinding. Nonetheless, both agreements offer legal incentives to 
Members in order to further voluntary compliance with nonbinding norms. For 
example, under SPS, if a Member bases its sanitary regulation on the Codex 
Alimentarius, one of the international standards that SPS endorses, it is 
presumed to comply with the relevant provisions of both SPS and GATT. 
International standards will be discussed below in greater detail. 
Yet both SPS and TBT give much more weight to circumstances in which 
Members do not rely on international standards than those in which Members 
do. There are a couple of reasons for this situation. First, the use of international 
standards is nonbinding and voluntary because they are not formal treaties 
legislated under the banner of the WTO. Therefore, Members retain the right to 
take any necessary measures, whether based on the relevant international 
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standards or not, to achieve other legitimate objectives such as protection of 
human health and safety. Second, in many cases these standards are nonexistent. 
Even where they do exist, they tend still to be evolving, often taking the form of 
a lowest common denominator, and thus fall short of the regulatory 
expectations of Members accustomed to exercising a higher level of regulatory 
protection in similar situations encountered at the domestic level. These 
circumstances tend to lead both SPS and TBT to focus on “process-oriented” 
disciplines, rather than on substantive disciplines involving international 
standards. In other words, these agreements concern “how to regulate,” rather 
than “what to regulate.” This “manner-oriented” approach parallels the “chapeau 
test” recently found in the WTO jurisprudence and constitutes a keystone in 
addressing linkage problems within the context of SPS and TBT because the 
approach enables Members to retain their regulatory autonomy while minimizing 
the trade-restrictive effects of their regulations. It does so by ensuring 
administrative due process in such areas as risk assessment, consistency, 
transparency, and reason giving. Therefore, as David Victor observes, these due 
process disciplines focus on “convergence in procedures” but not necessarily 
“convergence in particular regulatory outcomes.”175 In this sense, both SPS and 
TBT constitute a form of quasi-harmonization.  
3. Surveillance  
Trade disputes are not brewed overnight. Rather, trade frictions usually 
precede the outbreak of full-fledged disputes. Once a dispute is announced, 
registered, and adjudicated, it is very easy for it to escalate beyond the control of 
the parties. Therefore, if frictions can be diffused before they reach the level of 
disputes, much time, energy and expense will be saved. Trade disputes related to 
linkage issues are no exception. This is why a surveillance and monitoring 
mechanism such as the Trade Policy Review Mechanism is required.176 
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possible about the conditions of trade. It is therefore fundamentally important 
that regulations and policies are transparent. In the WTO, this is achieved in 
two ways: governments have to inform the WTO and fellow-members of 
specific measures, policies or laws through regular ‘notifications’; and the 
WTO conducts regular reviews of individual countries’ trade policies—the 
trade policy reviews.” 
 Id. 
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The TPRM periodically reviews Member countries’ trade policies and 
trade-related regulatory policies for the “improved adherence by all Members to 
rules, disciplines and commitments”177 under the WTO system. For this 
purpose, each Member is required to report its trade policies and practices on a 
regular basis to the Trade Policy Review Body, which is another name for the 
WTO General Council.178 The TPRM is basically a “peer review” process,179 
rather than an enforcement mechanism. Thanks to the managerial nature of this 
process, Members can fine-tune both their trade and trade-related regulatory 
policies to address the interface between free trade and state regulation in an 
inconspicuous yet effective fashion. This may be accomplished through informal 
discussion and deliberation free from undue escalation and politicization.180  
4. International Standards and Government Networks 
As discussed above, harmonization through international standards, no 
matter how soft those standards may be from the perspective of legal force, could 
be a way of addressing linkage issues in certain areas since it would enable 
adopting Members to achieve the dual goals of free trade and regulatory 
protection. In fact, both TBT and SBS expressly require Member States to use 
international standards to the maximum extent possible, as well as to participate 
vigorously in standard-setting activities.181 In addition, both TBT and SBS give a 
burden of proof incentive to any Member State that bases its regulation on 
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international standards.182 Furthermore, as an obvious indication of their role in 
encouraging transgovernmental cooperation for regulatory harmonization, both 
TBT and SBS co-opt certain international regulatory institutions including the 
International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”),183 the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (“IEC”),184 and the “Codex Alimentarius 
Commission.”185 These co-opted regulatory institutions serve as shells for 
transgovernmental cooperation under the auspices of TBT and SPS. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the standards set forth in such 
agreements has often been questioned. While international standards may reflect 
certain professional values since they are crafted by qualified experts, the 
domestic administrative and political procedures involved in actually 
recognizing, accrediting, and finally adopting these standards tend to be more 
complicated than they first appear. We often see that political anxiety 
surrounding a certain regulatory area is allowed to trump scientific evidence. The 
public tends to react emotionally and excessively to a scandalous event such as 
an outbreak of mad cow disease. When confronting such situations, 
governments usually respond by pandering to public concern and strengthening 
regulations, rather than by educating the public in a manner that reduces 
excessive fear. Moreover, as human health and safety command greater political 
attention, consensus becomes harder than ever to achieve, even among the 
professionals charged with developing the standards.186 
Notwithstanding these misgivings about international standards, the 
importance of close cooperation and communication among epistemic, like-
minded regulators, which many scholars define as “networking,”187 should not 
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be trivialized. Although very few government networks produce visible 
regulations in the form of standards or guidelines, networking itself tends to 
contribute to the achievement of regulatory objectives because regulators learn 
from and enlighten one another in the process of communicating and 
exchanging views. In particular, if regulatory networking is conducted under the 
auspices of the WTO, in a manner that takes into account the subtle interface 
between regulatory and trade issues, it could potentially provide a reliable way of 
addressing some linkage issues. Admittedly, networking does not deliver a ready-
made solution to the linkage problem as a whole. Yet networking certainly can 
ease the tension arising from linkage phenomena on an incremental basis 
because everyday regulators who are educated in the networking process can 
modify and adapt their regulatory behaviors—again, on an incremental scale—
toward a better approach to reconciling the tension. Even if such networking is 
obstructed by complicated political processes, whether between North and 
South or within North or South, its forum-making function will at least 
contribute to increasing transparency in the WTO’s policy-making process as 
well as to enhancing the level of policy coordination among states, as seen in the 
example of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (“CTE”).188 
The case for the aforementioned “soft” approach, vis-à-vis the “hard” 
approach represented by formal negotiations and legislation, becomes stronger 
in light of the reality of current WTO negotiations. First, developing countries 
have already officially “de-link[ed]” labor from trade by nailing down a firm 
statement in Ministerial Declarations that the International Labor Organization 
(“ILO”) is the competent body for handling this issue, and that the use of labor 
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standards for protectionist purposes should be prohibited.189 Moreover, it seems 
unlikely that linkage issues would be addressed within the WTO through hard 
mechanisms such as legislation (treaty making) or amendment, at least in the 
near future. The fact that developed countries finally agreed, albeit reluctantly, to 
drop three of four “Singapore issues” from the Doha Round negotiation 
supports such a forecast.190 Singapore issues—in other words, competition, 
investment, government procurement, and trade facilitation—were originally 
tabled and accepted as a potential negotiation agenda by developed countries in 
the first WTO Ministerial Conference in 1996.191 Since that time they have 
haunted subsequent WTO negotiations. Frequently invoked by developed 
countries as red herrings to counteract the demands of developing countries to 
repeal agricultural subsidies, the Singapore Issues eventually sunk the fifth 
Ministerial Conference in Cancún in 2003.192 Yet during negotiations conducted 
under the Doha Round—which is often dubbed the “development round”—
rich countries finally agreed to jettison competition and investment issues while 
at the same time repealing or reducing agricultural subsidies. Based on this case, 
it seems strategic linkages are not likely to happen, at least in the foreseeable 
future. Under these circumstances, a calm, modest yet incrementally effective 
approach to linkage, using soft law and cooperative networking, seems to be 
more suitable than a hard, politically driven approach involving formal 
negotiations and legislation.  
Importantly, networking need not be conducted solely within the WTO. 
The WTO is still a trade organization. The fact that the WTO should faithfully 
listen and respond to legitimate demands of linkage does not mean that it should 
metamorphose into something other than a trade organization. No matter how 
successful it has been as a trade organization, the WTO should not become a 
victim of its own success by seeking to accommodate all other nontrade issues 
under its own roof. Moreover, the WTO is not an island in the international 
community.193 Diverse international institutional arrangements may lend the 
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WTO their more flexible, yet focused hands to address linkages issues in a 
variety of ways, degrees, and contexts.  
Indeed, regulatory networking often takes place in softer institutional 
settings than the WTO, such as the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (“OECD”) or Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”). 
The institutional flexibility represented by the informality and nonbinding nature 
of these organizations can encourage participants to explore solutions to various 
linkage scenarios through the application of soft law (recommendations, 
standards, and guidelines), without the burden of legal commitments and the 
associated practice of strategic filibustering.194 In fact, both organizations are 
currently devoting considerable resources to addressing various linkage issues. 
Under APEC, both regulators (public) and regulatees (private) engage in close 
epistemic networking with one another on sector-specific linkage issues such as 
trade and human safety, thereby producing realistic guidelines and 
arrangements.195 Empirical confirmation of this process exists in such forms as 
the Guidelines for the Preparation, Adoption, and Review of Technical 
Regulations and APEC Food Mutual Recognition Agreements (“MRA”).196  
Under the OECD, linkage issues are addressed in the context of 
“regulatory reform.”197 This project is a policy response to the belief that 
modern governments should secure better regulations while not yielding to trade 
barriers.198 A comprehensive 1997 Report on Regulatory Reform strongly 
recommended the use of soft law, in the form of “internationally harmoni[z]ed 
standards,” to solve the linkage dilemma.199 In parallel with this Report, the 
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OECD Program on Public Management and Governance (“PUMA”) has been 
hosting the Regulatory Management and Reform Network that consists of 
government officials responsible for regulatory management and reform 
activities in Member countries.200 
In a propitious move, an APEC-OECD Agreement on Joint Work on 
Regulatory Reform was initiated in 2000. The Joint Work aims to implement 
OECD and APEC principles by elaborating an APEC-OECD “Integrated 
Checklist” for self-assessment on linkage issues, such as “regulatory, competition 
and market openness policies.”201  
In sum, this softer approach to linkage tends to emphasize that linkage 
issues are better “managed” than “solved.” After countries have built up 
sufficient confidence and consensus following a lengthy rehearsal process, they 
may ratchet up to a harder, more official forum such as the WTO. Put 
differently, current circumstances suggest that osmosis seems to work better 
than compulsion.  
5.  Interinstitutional Cooperation 
The WTO’s institutional identity as a trade organization naturally leads it to 
addressing various linkage issues by cooperating in various ways with sector-
specific international regulatory organizations. Scholars acknowledge the 
importance of this interinstitutional relationship. Robert Howse argues that we 
should try to shape the trade rules and their interpretations to capture the 
“interaction[s]” of the trading system with other institutions, rather than attempt 
to decide what should be “in” or “out of” the mandate of the WTO.202 This 
argument reflects David Leebron’s idea of “regime linkage,” which describes 
possible interactions between regimes that are created to govern specific 
regulatory issues.203  
The intensity of such interinstitutional cooperation varies according to the 
circumstances presented by each linkage phenomenon. One encounters both 
mild and intense interinstitutional relationships between the WTO and other 
international regulatory agencies. In terms of mild institutional relationships, 
which call to mind the aforementioned patterns of networking, the Doha 
Declaration explicitly set a negotiation agenda for “regular information 
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exchange” between the MEAs’ secretariats and the CTE as well as the MEAs’ 
“observer status” in the CTE.204 In implementing this agenda, Members have 
recently agreed on the observer status, albeit on an ad hoc basis, of the United 
Nations Environmental Program (“UNEP”) and the following six MEAs: the 
Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and 
Fauna (“CITES”), the Convention on Biodiversity (“CBD”), the Montreal 
Protocol on Ozone-depleting Substances, the International Tropical Timber 
Organization (“ITTO”), and the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (“UNFCCC”).205 This institutional cooperation between the WTO’s 
CTE and MEAs can make a major contribution to ensuring “coherence” 
between trade and environmental policies,206 thereby mitigating the tension 
between free trade and environmental protection in the long run. 
Yet it is difficult in practice to forge robust relationships among 
organizations. Although the WTO has several “cooperation agreements” with 
other international organizations such as the IMF,207 the practical value of such 
agreements has been questionable because the level of involvement of these 
organizations in the WTO, at least in terms of regulatory cooperation, has not 
been impressive. Several factors may explain this lack of cooperation. First, the 
WTO’s scant budget tends to discourage serious interinstitutional engagement, 
which inevitably requires considerable resources and investment. Second, 
networks linking domestic and international bureaucrats working in trade and 
other social policy areas are not well developed. Because bureaucrats or 
policymakers from each trade sector or nontrade social policy area tend to 
represent their own values, a coherent forum to bring these disparate views 
together in one place is unlikely to emerge on its own. Rather, such a forum 
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must be created, which inevitably involves the commitment of considerable 
institutional resources. Finally, difficult problems of jurisdiction and competence 
are likely to cloud any serious effort at resolving the linkage dilemma. Indeed, 
the question of what institution should be the final arbiter as to a particular 
subject matter extends well beyond the terrain of cooperation to the 
constitutional dimension.  
It could be the case that the WTO’s “unilateral” adoption of certain 
regulatory decisions by other international agencies, in the form of “co-
optation,” will work better than the infeasible forms of institutional cooperation 
discussed above. Originally, the concept of co-optation derives from the field of 
corporations. Co-optation represents a process of incorporating new elements 
into the policymaking structure of an organization in order to overcome 
challenges to its stability.208 Considering the mounting tension between trade and 
social values, which has the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the global 
trading system, it seems not only plausible but also necessary for the WTO to 
absorb certain sector-specific regulatory elements into its operation. In this 
connection, it is worthwhile to note that the WTO’s two important linkage 
agreements, SPS and TBT, were modeled after the EU’s harmonization rules 
and practices, in particular the New Approach and the Global Approach.209 
Another interesting channel of co-optation is the WTO tribunal. As a 
matter of fact, a panel organized under the old GATT sought a regulatory 
opinion from other international regulatory institutions in adjudicating a trade 
case before it. Specifically, the panel in the Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of 
and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes case referred to the World Health Organization 
(“WHO”) the question of whether the Thai government’s ban on Western 
cigarettes could be justified to protect human health. Although the panel 
eventually dismissed the WHO’s professional regulatory opinion, this case 
provides a strong precedent for future judicial co-optation within the context of 
the GATT dispute settlement procedure. The DSU subsequently provided a 
textual ground for such judicial co-optation in the form of the stipulation that 
“[p]anels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts 
to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter.”210 It is not difficult for 
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international regulatory institutions to be interpreted as falling under the rubric of 
“any relevant source.” At the same time, regulatory decisions co-opted by panels 
and the Appellate Body from other international agencies need not bind them. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article highlights the potentially perilous tension between free trade 
and social regulation, and suggests a multifaceted list of solutions based on 
institutional feasibility. The global trading system has come to require a new telos 
capable of transcending the narrow purpose of antiprotection while at the same 
time connoting a much broader ideal of “integration” that ensures that both 
trade values and social values are upheld not in a competing, but in a coherent 
and synergetic fashion. This constitutional vision, which is embedded in the 
concept of linkage itself, inevitably touches on the profound issue of 
“legitimacy.” The global trading system is “composed not only of States but also, 
indeed mostly, of individual economic operators,” such as producers, importers, 
and consumers.211 There is an inseparable connection between the ever growing 
quantity of international business transactions and the discipline provided by 
international trade law. If the dual goal of free markets and social regulation is 
achieved in a coherent way within the far reaching field of international 
economic law, it will make the global trading system operate in a more stable 
and predictable way,212 and thus enhance its general acceptability not only among 
governments, but also among ordinary people. 
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